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# **West Europe Report**

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## WEST EUROPE REPORT

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## CONTENTS

## ENERGY ECONOMICS

## FINLAND

- Briefs  
Energy Consumption Drops 1

## NORWAY

- New North Sea Field More Than Doubles Country's Oil Reserves  
(DAGENS NYHETER, 6 Jun 81)..... 2
- Briefs  
Oil Find in North 4

## ECONOMIC

## CYPRUS

- Finance Minister Calls for New Economic Planning  
(CYPRUS MAIL, 3 Jun 81)..... 5
- Election Results, New Economic Policies Analyzed  
(CYPRUS MAIL, 5 Jun 81)..... 6

## ICELAND

- Government Gets Tougher Price Control Law Passed  
(NEWS FROM ICELAND, Jun 81)..... 9

## ITALY

- CESPE Study on Labor Market for 1977-80  
(Fabrizio Carmignani; POLITICA ED ECONOMIA, Apr 81)..... 11

## NETHERLANDS

- Shipbuilding Industry Shows Further Recovery  
(ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU, 4 Jun 81)..... 26

## SWEDEN

- SAAB Invited by Large Builders To Join Aircraft Project  
(Helena Stalnert; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 1 Jun 81)..... 28

## POLITICAL

### BELGIUM

- Tindemans on 'Malaise' of Flemish Social Christian Party  
(Leo Tindemans; LE SOIR, 6 Jun 81)..... 30

### CYPRUS

- DEV-IS Signs Communique With Greek Cypriots  
(BOZKURT, 19 May 81)..... 32

- Electioneering Continues in TFSC  
(BOZKURT, 23 May 81, HALKIN SESI, 25, 26 May 81)..... 33

Ozgur Charges Denktas With Divisiveness  
Cagatay Claims NUP Will Govern Alone, Cagatay Interview  
Durduran Explains Platform, Stresses NUP Weaknesses,  
Alpay Durduran Interview

### FINLAND

- Erkki Liikanen Favored To Win Party Secretaryship in SDP Congress  
Duel  
(Jan-Anders Ekstrom; HUFVUDSTAIDSBLADET, 3 Jun 81)..... 39

- CP Congress Approves Sweeping Personnel Changes in Organs  
(Pekka Vuoristo; SUOMEN KUVALEHTI, 29 May 81)..... 43

- CP Chairman Saarinen Pledges To Step Down in 2 Years  
(Anneli Sundberg; HELSINGIN SANOMAT, 31 May 81)..... 48

### ICELAND

- Independence Party Gaining Ground  
(NEWS FROM ICELAND, Jun 81)..... 52



## NORWAY

Poll: Impetus for Labor From Brundtland Seen Ebbing (Eivind G. Karlsen; AFTENPOSTEN, 30 May 81).....	53
Poll Shows Most Prefer Multi Party, Nonsocialist Cabinet (AFTENPOSTEN, 30 May 81).....	55
Nonsocialist Parties Work To Agree on Long-Range Plan (Terje Svabo; AFTENPOSTEN, 30 May 81).....	59
Paper Comments on Poll Showing Gains for Nonsocialists (Editorial; AFTENPOSTEN, 1 Jun 81).....	61
Poor Ministry Coordination Allowed Soviet Oil Search (Morten Pyhn; AFTENPOSTEN, 26 May 81).....	63
Briefs Liberal Chairman's Seat Vulnerable	65

## SWEDEN

Two Parties in Government Viewed as Having Serious Weaknesses (Editorial; SVENSKA DAGBLADET, 30 May 81).....	66
---	----

## TURKEY

No Change Expected in Turkish-French Relations (CUMHURIYET, 12 May 81).....	68
Turkey Remains in European Parliament (M. Ali Birand; MILLIYET, 15 May 81).....	71
Lawyers Call for Assembly Representation (CUMHURIYET, 17 May 81).....	75

## MILITARY

### FRANCE

Status of Larzac Military Camp Expansion (LE MONDE, 30 May-1 Jun 81).....	77
Firepower, Mobility of Ground Forces Weapons Reviewed (Gerard Vaillant; DEFENSE NATIONALE, Jun 81).....	79


## BRIEFS

ENERGY CONSUMPTION DROPS--Energy consumption declined during January-March by about three percent compared with the same period last year. One of the causes of this is that total production in the country has stagnated. Furthermore, energy price rises have contributed to energy saving. These results are from the preliminary report on energy economy which was prepared by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. Nuclear power plants produced record amounts of electricity at the start of the year. Consumption of electricity increased by three percent during the first quarter, while the average increase last year was fully five percent. Oil consumption declined within all consumption areas. Use of oil in energy production declined by fully 10 percent during January-March. This has meant that oil's share of total energy has declined from last year's 48 percent to 44 percent. The use of coal declined at the end of last year while nuclear power production increased. Nuclear power's share increased markedly and comprised 12 percent of the total energy. The nuclear power share of electricity production rose during the first quarter to a record 29.6 percent. During the 12-month period ending in March the country's 4 nuclear power plants produced a total of 7.9 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity. During January-March a total of 10.8 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity were produced, which is 9 percent less than last year. The import of electricity increased significantly, while export decreased. The import of energy declined 6 percent, or 190 million marks. Import prices for fuel were on the average clearly higher than 1 year ago. Coal prices increased the most, by 71 percent, and natural gas by 65 percent. The price of crude oil was 1,114 marks per ton, which is about 25 percent higher than the price in January-March last year. [Text] [Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 2 Jun 81 p 14] 9287

CSO: 3109/200

## NEW NORTH SEA FIELD MORE THAN DOUBLES COUNTRY'S OIL RESERVES

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Jun 81 p 19



[Text] More oil than all the other Norwegian fields combined. That is how the Norwegian Ministry of Oil and Energy first officially characterized area 31 off Bergen where last year Shell made the largest gas discovery so far in the Norwegian North Sea.

Now the government has decided to give three Norwegian companies, Statoil, Saga and Norsk Hydro the right to begin test drilling in three new blocks, 31/3, 31/5 and 31/6.

No foreign interests have been admitted as partners in the record area.

The Ministry of Oil and Energy also anticipates such large profits in the area that the two privately owned companies, Saga and Norsk Hydro, want to negotiate with the government on how the profits from area 31 will be used. A dramatic increase of Norwegian oil production during the next 10 years was not explained by Minister of Oil and Energy Arvid Johanson in the Storting when oil policies were discussed.

Norway's total production of oil and gas during the next decade will be between 600 and 700 million tons of oil units of a value of 630 billion Norwegian kroner.

(The figure 600 to 700 million tons of oil units includes gas converted to oil units.)

The estimated production of the 1980's can be compared with the 190 billion [as published] tons of North Sea oil which Norway produced during the first 10 years of production. The worth of that production amounted to 110 billion kroner or 27,999 kroner per Norwegian citizen.

Minister of Oil and Energy Johanson said before the Storting that the Norwegian society entered the oil age with mixed feelings.

"Now we know that none of us has become a King Midas, with everything we touch turning to gold. But neither has Norway been turned upside down or destroyed, as certain know-it-alls predicted," said the minister.

The goal of 90 billion [as published] tons of oil units per year is still valid, but reaching it is farther in the future than the government thought, according to Johanson. It can perhaps be reached some time in the 1990's. This year's production will be 50 million tons, which is the same as for 1980.

9287

CSO: 3109/199

## BRIEFS

OIL FIND IN NORTH--Norwegian Statoil has found both gas and oil in the second drilling on the Tromso shelf, according to Norwegian TV news. In the tests previously made, layers of oil-bearing sandstone were found which were over 100 meters thick. It is still too early to say if the discovery can be profitable to exploit, but it is considered sensational that three of the four test drillings on the Tromso shelf found oil and gas. Norway's Minister of Oil and Energy Arvid Johanson said on Thursday evening on Norwegian TV that certain amounts of gas can be exported to Sweden and Finland. In cooperation with West German Ruhrgas and Swedish Swedegas, Statoil has begun to investigate the possibilities of building a gas pipeline from the Tromso shelf to the Continent. Such a pipeline, which could be taken through Kiruna and Malmo, is estimated to cost 20 billion kroner. [Text] [Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Jun 81 p 19] 9287

CSO: 3109/199

## FINANCE MINISTER CALLS FOR NEW ECONOMIC PLANNING

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 3 Jun 81 p 1

[Text] **T**HE MINISTER of Finance, Mr A. Afxentiou, yesterday spoke about a shift of emphasis of short-term government economic policies during the fourth emergency economic action plan.

There was need for a new approach to short-term economic policy with emphasis on the reduction of pressure of destabilising factors, the Minister said.

He was speaking at a gathering of the Lions Club in Nicosia when he referred to the attainments of the period 1979/81 and the plans for the period beyond.

The target for the third emergency action plan (1979/81) for an average economic growth of 5.2 per cent at constant factor prices is expected to be realised despite the obvious celebration during this period.

The rate of growth of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at constant prices dropped from 7.5 per cent in 1979 to 4.3 per cent in 1980 and is expected to fall further to 3.8 per cent in 1981.

But, he said, these rates were obtained under conditions of full employment (average rate of unemployment 2.2 per cent).

The Minister noted that these targets were achieved with a greatly reduced total volume of investments. The investment in machinery and equipment was much reduced though investment in construction work and housing exceeded the programmed levels.

These developments, the Minister said, are expected to have negative effects on the rate of productivity growth which has already shown a tendency to fall.

The Minister referred to the deficit in the balance of current transactions and said that the government had preferred to resort to foreign borrowing to ease pressure on foreign exchange reserves which it was thought advisable should be maintained at levels higher than those internationally prevailing.

Referring to the need for revision of the short-term management of the economy, Mr Afxentiou said this should include fiscal and money-lending policy and the prices and incomes policy.

«These targets should aim at offsetting as much as possible inflationary pressures and pressures on the balance of payments, in other words they must aim at stabilisation of the economy», he said.

Mr Afxentiou said the basic objective should be a high rate of economic development under conditions of stability but

agreed that some of the state's objectives are conflicting.

Therefore, he said, there was a need for priorities to be laid down and he thought that these could be in this order: maintenance of conditions of full employment, a satisfactory level of provisional accommodation and living for displaced persons, extension of social expenditure as a percentage of the national income, and securing fuller participation of the lower income classes in the benefits of economic prosperity.



## ELECTION RESULTS, NEW ECONOMIC POLICIES ANALYZED

Nicosia CYPRUS MAIL in English 5 Jun 81 p 2

[Text] **I**N A PRESIDENTIAL system of government such as that of Cyprus, it is tempting to dismiss the role of parliament (in Cyprus the House of Representatives) in the making of economic policy as unimportant or almost irrelevant. But this would be to ignore in general the role of parliament as a check on government activity, and to misunderstand the workings of the House in Cyprus.

For although parliament in Cyprus has been controlled by the government, and often appeared to be a rubber stamp for government actions, the very existence of a parliament has acted as a constraint on the government. General limits to the government were set by the knowledge of what would not pass, or rather, what would not pass the House easily.

The House has in fact, in a quiet way, striven hard to improve the legislation put before it, and to bring important development issues before the government. Most of this very constructive work was in fact done without publicity, in committee sessions, and consequently the public is hardly aware that the house has been able to play a positive role.

For most of the period since independence the house has not tried to block bad bills but to persuade the government to alter them so that they may

be acceptable to parliament. Controversy in public was avoided, but many people felt that this meant that the House of Representatives was not carrying out its proper function.

The old House of Representatives was in fact the best since Independence, and the more active members consistently tried to improve government bills. In fact some of the lawyers complained that they even had to improve, in some cases, the legal wording of bills as well as general policy aspects.

#### Results

Certainly the most outstanding achievement of the last house lay in the debates on the problems of the Co-operative movement, and the strong stand taken by the House seems to have set the pace for the executive action that followed. The Co-operative debates demonstrated effectively that the House can influence the government as much moral persuasion as by its constitutional legislative powers.

Now the new House of Representatives promises to be much livelier than any previous parliament, and consequently it will have to be weighed in the balance both by the government and the civil service. For the outcome of the election promises that none of the four parties represented in the House can be ignored by the government when it presents bills for approval. But this is also because the new House is likely to undertake more initiatives than any other parliament has previously done.

In order to appreciate properly the role of the new parliament, one should first consider three conclusions that we may draw from the election results. First, all four parties which obtained seats can be said (for different reasons) to be victors, while at the same time all the parties that contested the election can be considered losers. The communist party AKEL is a victor because it won the most votes. The Democratic Rally is victorious because it gained representation in parliament, obtained as many seats as AKEL, and is the largest non-communist party, and can also claim to be the nearest thing to an opposition party in Cyprus.

But the Democratic Party also won because its percentage of the vote was higher than most people expected, and certainly high enough to squash any suggestion that the President should resign because he is unpopular. In addition the destruction of the small centre-parties must have given the Democratic Party considerable satisfaction. But the Socialist Party EDEK can also claim to have won through, because it gained its three members from its own efforts and its own resources and at a time when it was seriously threatened by competition from Dr Sofianos party.

Nevertheless, all the parties can also be said to have lost something in the elections, and there is certainly a very sober post-election political atmosphere. AKEL did not win by the margin it had planned for, and the strength of the Democratic Rally certainly poses

the spectre of a dangerous polarisation of Cyprus politics. Even the fact that EDEK got some members voted in must have been a disappointment to AKEL.

Similarly the Democratic Rally was disappointed at gaining only second in voting strength and also by the fact that it is no longer possible to ignore the very large voting strength of the Communist Party. Another disappointment was the strong showing of the Democratic Party, and the recognition that all future elections, tests are likely to be both difficult and costly. But the Democratic Party also lost because it must form an alliance with one of the two parliamentary powers, and here AKEL is the obvious candidate. For EDEK the election result clearly demonstrates that it is a minority party. Of course the three new centre parties were simply wiped out.

### Class

The second conclusion that we draw from the election result is that people voted on class grounds and not on the basis of policy regarding the Cyprus problem. Some people have therefore rushed to the conclusion that this means that the Cyprus problem has been relegated to a position of secondary importance, and that economic and social factors are now more important, others take things a step further and say that the Cypriot has virtually recognised the status quo.

We believe that these interpretations are greatly mistaken, and are in fact very dangerous. It is our view that the Cyprus problem does not appear to have been a deciding factor, because none of the parties were able to convince the people that they could deliver an acceptable solution. Since this was not possible, people fell back onto class differences and social policies as a basis for differentiating between the parties.

This implies that should serious differences on the Cyprus question arise again between the parties, this most serious of all issues will again

become a catalyst for differentiation between the parties. In fact the election demonstrated that no party can stray very far from the commonly accepted conditions for a solution i.e. the refugees right to return home should they wish to, etc.

The third conclusion is that the government is going to find a very vocal, well organized, and large opposition in the House. This opposition is likely to consist of both the Democratic Rally and the Socialist Party EDEK, despite the fact that these two parties are bitterly opposed to each other.

With respect to economic policy we anticipate that these two opposition parties will strongly oppose the Budget. EDEK will do this because it wants a more radical economic policy implemented by the government, and because over the last two years it has voted against the government's budgetary proposals. The Democratic Rally is also expected to challenge the Budget, because it would want to embarrass the government and if possible force early presidential elections.

As a result, we anticipate that the 1982 Budget will be extremely carefully prepared, and very well justified. This implies that parliament will be making a serious impact on the working of the Civil Service, particularly with respect to the justification of new projects.

### Common Market

The effect of having a large and vocal opposition in parliament, will make the passing of economic measures much more difficult and this will result in more pressure on the civil service. This, hopefully, will bring out weaknesses in the civil service, and jolt the whole creaking mechanism into greater efficiency and alertness.

Eventually parliamentary criticism should result in better prepared legislation, and more carefully worked out projects. Rows over supplementary budgetary provisions are also likely to force the adoption of improved and more careful budget preparation practices by departments.

Of all questions of economic policy the most difficult is likely to involve the new range

of agreements to be signed later this year, or early next year, with the Common Market (EEC). Since AKEL and EDEK will definitely oppose any movement towards a customs union with the EEC, the government will be forced to depend on Democratic Rally support in order to get any agreement through.

The only other alternative is for the government to make an abrupt change in policy and go for a trade agreement with the EEC, which would secure it full AKEL and EDEK support.

This alternative is, however, unlikely to be adopted by the government, because it is firmly committed to the idea of customs union and the idea of linking Cyprus to the west. Since the Democratic Rally is also firmly committed to the closest possible links with the EEC, the government could be reasonably sure that on this one issue the Rally M.P.'s will not oppose it and will vote with it. Presented with this chance to embarrass the Government, however, the Democratic Rally could vote against any agreement on grounds of bad handling of the situation or any other issue of tactics. Certainly, the temptation will be great.

Another interesting issue will be that of rent control legislation. At present a law introduced by AKEL provides

for a total rent freeze, but this was a short-term measure which will expire soon. The Democratic Party and the Democratic Rally are opposed to a rent freeze in principle, but since the removal of the present law will be unpopular it is difficult to see the Rally helping the government by supporting its rent control legislation.

The result may, therefore, be that either the Government will be more willing to adopt some of the views of the left-wing parties, or else parliament will pass its own compromise bill.

One measure that all the M.P.'s will be in favour of is anti-monopoly legislation, and here the new parliament is likely to take matters into its own hands and introduce its own bill if the government

continues to delay such popular legislation. The three non-government parties all agree on the need for such legislation, though they will almost certainly disagree on its provisions.

And though the Democratic Party has not clearly stated its position, the Minister of Finance in a T.V. interview strongly supported such legislation. Certainly, he who introduces such a bill will gain popularity.

The election result also puts a question mark over the future of the Bill providing for the raising of interest rates. This has lain in the House for a long time now, and though some form of change in interest rates is generally accepted, it is difficult to see which parties would be willing to support this measure.

In general, the new parliament is expected to be lively and active. Its contribution to economic policy making will be significant, and with luck it might help to bring greater efficiency to the Civil Service. The main disadvantage is that it may slow down government decision making, but this should be outweighed by the advantages of more carefully prepared programmes.

CSO: 4600/13

## GOVERNMENT GETS TOUGHER PRICE CONTROL LAW PASSED

Reykjavik NEWS FROM ICELAND in English Jun 81 p 15

[Text] In Iceland the fight against inflation goes on. Every three or four months, for about a week, the nation witnesses a flurry of activities surrounding new anti-inflation legislation. These products of unstable coalition governments reflect short-run compromises and short-run solutions and tend to aim directly at the wage-price or the price-wage spiral, depending on the political viewpoint.

Economic measures introduced on last New Year's Eve sidetracked an imminent 7 percent increase in wages and also gave high priority to a policy of price freeze, which had, in fact, been pursued for the previous ten years. The severe restrictions on price increases were to be in effect until May 1, 1981. Three days before that deadline, the government presented a new economic bill to Althing which was voted into law on April 30.

Strict price controls are to continue, according to the new law, but this time with a twist as the services of the courts have been enlisted in the fight against inflation. The price control authorities are now able to seek injunctions against illegal and excessive price increases, an approach which suggests that Iceland's forty-year-old inflation may finally be put to rest by the judicial branch of the government. This new version of the price freeze is to continue until the end of the year. The law states that the government will

set quarterly inflation targets, and that all price increases in excess of these guidelines will require confirmation by the entire cabinet.

In addition to extending the price freeze for another eight months, the new economic law deals with three other issues. The first is the reduction of a special excise tax on soft drinks which had been introduced in December. According to the economic law of demand, the tax, which was 30 percent, had substantially reduced the quantity of soft drinks sold — with predictable consequences for employment in the firms concerned. The tax has now been reduced to 17 percent, and the Finance Ministry authorized a rebate to the firms of a fraction up to 1/6 of these tax payments for March and April.

In another paragraph the law authorizes the government to cut spending by up to 31 million kronur (U.S. \$4.6 million), including spending directly authorized by the Budget and the Credit Budget. Unspecified government spending cuts are old fixtures of the anti-inflation scene in Iceland, and veteran observers of the ongoing saga tend to disregard such vague declarations of intent.

Finally, the law empowers the Central Bank, acting in consultation with the government, to block an unspecified fraction of deposits in deposit money banks. Prior to the new law, the Bank could block up to 25 percent of total deposits and had done so

already. The Central Bank stands in great need of new and flexible instruments to control key monetary variables, such as the money supply or commercial bank lending.

The new authority could potentially begin a new area of active monetary policy in Iceland, but it could also be misused and prove totally counter-productive. As cost-push ideas dominate discussions about inflation and funds are scarce, and as the link between money and inflation is barely recognized by politicians, the danger is present that governments may use blocked funds to solve their short-run dilemmas. In fact, the current government has indicated that it may lend deposits blocked under the new law to the manufacturing industries through Central Bank rediscounting — thus keeping a promise made on New Year's Eve. Perverse uses of economic instruments, perverse from the viewpoint of anti-inflation policy, have been common in Iceland in recent years.

The strict price controls during the year's first four months may have created the illusion that the current policy has been a success. This is not so, as the long-run macro-economic relationships clearly show that the inflation undercurrents are still rapid, moving at a rate of 50 to 60 percent. The money supply, for example, has increased steadily at a rate of around 70 percent (increase over the 12

previous month, and wage and other cost increases have been temporarily postponed. Many private and public firms, which have not been allowed to raise prices to the extent requested, are extremely hard-pressed, and there are signs that the employment situation has weakened. It is indeed a short-run question when the dam will burst.

The exchange rate of the Kenya has not been allowed to slide for the first four months of the year, and it is understood that the government will maintain the current exchange rate through the month of May. There are speculations that the inevitable devaluation will come in June and amount to from 6 to 10 percent, but only time will tell.

CSO: 3120/59

## CESPE STUDY ON LABOR MARKET FOR 1977-80

Rome POLITICA ED ECONOMIA in Italian Apr 81 pp 33-38

[Article by Fabrizio Carmignani: "Research Studies by Center for Studies in Economic Policy"]

[Text] The Italian Labor Market, 1977-80

This study is divided into two parts; in the first one we tried to assign sociological scope to some job categories which will help in defining our labor force; in the second part we present an initial review of the developments on the labor market during the 1977-1980 3-year term.

The analysis raises more interpretative problems than it solves but that is not necessarily bad.

### 1. Labor Force Structure

The new quarterly survey by the ISTAT [Central Statistics Institute], started in 1977, provides a more detailed definition of the labor force which in the earlier series had simply been broken down into employed individuals and persons looking for jobs who, in turn, were broken down into unemployed (that is to say, persons who had lost their jobs and were looking for another one) and individuals who were looking for their first job.

The labor force structure, such as it results from the new survey, is shown in Table 1. The "declared employed" are precisely those individuals who, on first contact, told the interviewer that they were actually employed. The vast majority maintained that they held a "regular and continuing" job; a conspicuous segment had jobs of the "occasional" type; a less conspicuous group held "only seasonal" jobs. Then we have the "undeclared employed," that is to say, those individuals who, on first contact, reported a nonprofessional condition (housewife, student, retiree) but who then mentioned that they had put in working hours during the survey's reference week. Among persons looking for jobs, we added the category of "other persons seeking jobs," made up of those individuals who, having declared themselves to be in nonprofessional status, then said that they were looking for jobs.



Table 1. Occupational Breakdown by Sex in 1980

	Uomini 1	Femmine 2	Uomini e femmine 3
Occupati 4	95.1	86.9	92.5
Occupati dichiarati regolari 5	88.3	73.6	83.4
Occupati dichiarati occasionali 6	3.4	5.4	4.1
Occupati dichiarati stagionali 7	0.9	2.2	1.4
Occupati non dichiarati 8	2.5	5.7	3.6
Persone in cerca di occupazione 9	4.8	13.1	7.6
Disoccupati 10	0.8	1.3	0.9
In cerca di prima occupazione 11	2.8	6.3	4.0
Altre persone in cerca di lavoro 12	1.2	5.5	3.7
Totale	100.0	100.0	100.0

Key: 1--men; 2--women; 3--men and women; 4--employed; 5--declared regularly employed; 6--declared occasionally employed; 7--declared seasonally employed; 8--undeclared employed; 9--persons looking for jobs; 10--unemployed; 11--looking for first job; 12--other persons seeking jobs. Source: Breakdown based on ISTAT statistics.

The possibility and the limitations of the new survey in terms of recording some "noninstitutional" forms of participation in work, of a more or less irregular or intermittent type, which, according to widespread opinion, developed during the seventies, were effectively illustrated by V. Siesto<sup>1</sup>. It must be noted that this potential is not yet fully exploited; for example, the undeclared employed generally were taken as an indicator of intermittent work, on the correct assumption that this obviously does not involve institutional work since the same interview subject does not consider that kind of work to give him or her the status of an employed person. The presence of declared workers, who however have occasional or seasonal jobs, instead was mostly neglected and that is not justified since they are not only more numerous but since they are intermittent workers by "self-definition" and not by "deduction," as happened in the case of the undeclared employed.

Overall, noninstitutional work involves almost 8 percent of the male employment figures and 18 percent of the female employment figures, excluding from those figures a large portion of homework, work by minors<sup>2</sup>, and foreigners<sup>3</sup>, apprentices, as well as a portion of sporadic work done by many "unemployed"<sup>4</sup>.

#### Anatomy of Temporary Work

It is however not correct to consider the "occasional employed" and the "undeclared employed" as an undifferentiated mass since that causes us to skip over a whole series of questions that should be resolved. What persuades a temporary worker to label himself as such or not to declare his own status at first? Are we dealing here with two different degrees of temporary work and, if so, which of the two is

"more temporary?" Are we dealing here only with a different perception of the individual's own status and, if so, why are we getting different responses from workers who are in a similar situation? Or is this just a case of different social groups which, as such, have a different attitude toward work?

Digging a little bit deeper into those categories, we can get some answers, albeit partial ones. Table 2 shows us that the occasional employed are distributed by age groups similar to the distribution among regular employed<sup>5</sup>, being concentrated to a good measure among the central classes; the undeclared employed are concentrated on the other hand in the extreme classes, among the very young and the very old. Among men, the undeclared employed in the central classes are very few in number, in other words, 13.5 percent of the total, quite in contrast to the occasional employed; among the women, on the other hand, the size of the central classes is large in both categories. We furthermore know that the undeclared employed consist of housewives, retirees, and students.

Table 2. Occupational Distribution (1979) by Age Groups According to Type of Work and Sex

	1) Maschi		2) Femmine		3) Maschi e femmine	
	4) Occupati regolari	5) Occupati occasionali non dich.	6) Occupati regolari	5) Occupati occasionali non dich.	6) Occupati regolari	5) Occupati occasionali non dich.
14-24	11.9	18.6	22.7	20.4	17.6	15.7
25-29	11.3	9.4	5.4	14.4	11.0	7.0
30-49	52.6	33.2	13.5	48.0	45.8	39.6
50-59	19.7	19.7	15.5	14.2	17.8	21.0
60 e oltre 7)	4.4	17.0	42.9	2.9	8.0	16.6
Totale	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Key:

1. Men
2. Women
3. Men and women
4. Regular employed
5. Occasional employed
6. Undeclared employed
7. 60 and over

Source: Breakdown based on ISTAT data.

It is obvious at this point that the men in the central age group, not having a reserve social status to label themselves with, declare themselves to be employed, on first contact, also if they are doing work of the irregular type, while the young people and the old people do not consider this kind of work to be sufficient to make their employed status prevail over the institutional status of student or pensioner. For the women, the situation is different because the housewife as such has a rather ambiguous connotation: all married women are forced into the role of housewife. Declaring that status to be the main status depends not only on the regularity of the work done and the time put in, but also on the degree of identification which the individual woman has with that role; the choice is mostly subjective and this is why women in the middle age groups described themselves both among the occasional workers and among the undeclared workers.

These of course are tendential attributions: nobody would deny a retiree the right to declare himself employed momentarily and that explains the presence of occasional workers in the age group above 60 years. Similarly, the presence of young people among the occasional workers is explained by the fact that not all temporarily employed young people are students and that a student cannot label himself as such if he is interviewed during the summer season when he is working.

From what we have said so far it follows that the undeclared employed should be present throughout the country since research on the labor market during the seventies revealed the widespread existence, throughout the country, of temporary work done by young people, women, and old persons. The occasional workers should instead be present above all in the south and it is here as a matter of fact that irregular work is widespread also among men in the central age group and among young people who are not in student status.

As a matter of fact, this is precisely what we find not only in relative terms but also in absolute values and, rather significantly, among the occasional workers, the percentage of men is higher in the south than in the north-central section. Some problem might also spring from the fact that undeclared temporary work is widespread both in the north-central section and in the south to the same degree since we would expect to find more of that in the south. But it must be noted that, for many jobs which are done by students during the summer in the north-central section, work by minors is used in the south and that does not show up in the statistics. Besides, the undeclared position implies "putting in working hours during the survey's reference week"; if, as it seems, temporary work in the south is "more temporary" and if it involves shorter periods of time, it is simply less probable that a temporary worker in the south would show up in the statistics.

#### Need for Flow Data


To determine the degree of temporary nature of this kind of work, it would be necessary to have flow data which the ISTAT is not yet processing. The problem is essentially this: The data reported earlier consist of averages of the four quarterly surveys which the ISTAT carries out annually. What we do not know is the degree to which the inventory of workers turning up in each job category during a given quarter is made up of workers who show up in the same occupational category in the

earlier quarter or quarters. In other words, we do not have the fundamental information consisting of the time for which each individual remains in each job category. A short stay in a certain category--if, on the one hand, it multiplies the number of workers who, in the course of a year, go through a period of temporary work--however indicates that the temporary employment situation is a transitory thing, of course providing that the successive status is a status of steady work (but this likewise could be revealed by the flow data). The longer the period of stay happens to be, the more does the number of temporary workers diminish, that is to say, those temporary workers whose status is extended in terms of time however.

In the absence of flow data one might attempt an estimate of seasonal fluctuations with the reservation however that, if a high seasonal fluctuation of the labor force implies high mobility, a high degree of stability cannot exclude that.

Graph 1 shows the quarterly development of occupation among the undeclared employed, broken down by age groups. We can clearly see that in the 14-19-year age groups we have a very pronounced job seasonality which tends to be concentrated during the summer season. Here we are clearly dealing with senior high school students who work during that period of time. We thus have statistical confirmation of the relevance of a phenomenon which, in addition to being a common experience, has been revealed by research<sup>6</sup> only in some parts of the country. It should be noted that a marked seasonality in the same age groups exists also among the declared employed (Graph 2) and that this confirms what we said earlier as to the possibility that working students might join that category of workers, and they might probably even turn up among the occasional employed.

Figure 1. Undeclared Employed by Age Groups; Quarterly Data (Thousands)




Key:

1. January
2. April
3. July
4. October

Source: ISTAT



Figure 2. Declared Employed in 14-19 Year Age Groups; Quarterly Data (Thousands)



Key:

- |            |            |
|------------|------------|
| 1. January | 3. July    |
| 2. April   | 4. October |

Source: ISTAT

Work done by undeclared employed in the immediately following age group of 20-24 years does not reveal any characteristics of marked seasonality; among the undeclared employed in that age group we probably have many university students whom their student status permits to work also during other parts of the year. Work done by persons of advanced age also reveals marked seasonality which begins during the summer season but which extends all the way to October.

Analyzing the seasonality, we thus find that a good portion of the students and retirees can be found in a situation of seasonal temporary work; we know little about the others and about housewives since, in the case of the latter, we do not have any data of a seasonal character. We might attempt a further consideration by correcting a simplification which until now has been introduced in the form of including all undeclared employed in the temporary work area. As a matter of fact, the question as to the occasional nature of work done can be addressed also to this category and about 40 percent said that they work in a "regular and continuing" manner. Now, that is not a contradiction: Noninstitutional work, which does not create "status," is not said to be temporary (for example, the case of the aides) and if it is, it is not said to be occasional. Home workers, many university students, many retirees, are working temporarily but in a continuing fashion, even if only part-time.

As far as the occasional workers are concerned, they are not subject to marked seasonality. But it is probable that occasional work in the north-central section, where it is less widespread, might not represent a condition of chronic unemployment but rather a switch from one steady job to another. For young people, the phase of transition through this form of work is however longer.

In the south, on the other hand, the situation of occasional employment, is chronic for a large group of workers and mobility--which by definition must be high, since we are dealing with occasional work here--does happen among jobs of this type.

### Regular Work

So far we have said little about declared regular employed because the definition does not require any further clarification; they are bound to be workers who do work of a steady and guaranteed type. Indeed, if we want to check on seasonality, we will see that, overall, employment is not subjected to appreciable seasonal fluctuations. We are thus rather surprised by what we find partly in the industrial sector and here again regarding only male workers. While, in the case of the men, the seasonal aspect in the construction industry has an effect, it is also true that, looking at women's employment, the seasonal nature of the food industry sector is bound to have an effect, where women workers, present in large percentages, have even less steady jobs than men.

There is another question which must not be overlooked if we want to explore the "stability of steady work." In Italy we have 800,000 apprentices, many of whom are working in temporary status although they do work of a continuing type. Agreeing that it would be absurd for all of the 300,000 "undeclared" employed or "declared occasional" employed in the 14-19-year age group to be apprentices, it nevertheless follows that at least half of the approximately 900,000 declared regular employed in that same age group are apprentices.

In the same fashion we might estimate at about 250,000 those persons over the age of 65 who declare themselves to be employed on first contact, saying that they are working regularly and in a continuing fashion, and that certainly cannot involve "institutional" employment.

Among the declared regular employed we therefore also have rather large pockets of marginal labor.

### 2. Recent Labor Force Developments

The overall employment picture (Table 3) increased by 610,000 units between 1977 and 1980, as a result of an increase of 800,000 units in declared regular employment and a drop of 190,000 in the temporary component. Regular employment increased throughout the 4-year period, whereas irregular employment declined until 1979, picking up again however during the last year. Holding firm to 1977 and 1980 as reference points, we can specify that the irregular workers declined in all sectors, with the sole exception of undeclared young workers and occasional workers in the tertiary sector. One might think that the phenomenon might be attributed to an increase in temporary work throughout the country in the tourist sector. The occasional workers as a matter of fact are to be found to a great extent in the south while we know that the undeclared young workers, who are found above all in the north-central section, are to a great extent involved in the tourist and hotel industry.

Table 3. Labor Supply During 1977-1980 4-Year Period; Absolute Figures (Thousands)

	(1) Maschi				(2) Femmine				(3) Maschi e femmine			
	1977	1978	1979	1980	1977	1978	1979	1980	1977	1978	1979	1980
Occ. dich. regolari (4)	12 843	12 979	13 078	13 161	5 018	5 119	5 341	5 499	17 861	18 098	18 418	18 661
Occ. dich. occasionali (5)	601	560	521	510	423	411	382	402	1 024	972	904	912
Occ. dich. stagionali (6)	126	126	125	136	141	143	150	166	267	269	275	303
Occ. non dichiarati (7)	421	378	357	375	491	443	423	423	912	821	780	798
Totale occupati (8)	13 991	14 043	14 081	14 182	6 073	6 116	6 296	6 490	20 064	20 199	20 377	20 674
Disoccupati (9)	131	127	128	113	79	85	98	98	210	212	226	212
In cerca di prima occupazione (10)	340	364	413	421	353	408	453	468	694	792	866	840
Altri in cerca di lavoro (11)	203	179	189	181	438	387	417	415	642	567	625	546
In cerca di occupazione (12)	675	691	730	715	871	880	968	982	1 546	1 571	1 698	1 698
Totale forze di lavoro (13)	14 666	14 734	14 811	14 899	6 943	6 997	7 264	7 473	21 609	21 730	22 075	22 372
Altre persone disponibili a lavorare a particolari condizioni (14)	217	194	167	190	772	641	576	601	989	836	743	792

Key:

1. Men
2. Women
3. Men and women
4. Declared regular employed
5. Declared occasional employed
6. Declared seasonal employed
7. Undeclared employed
8. Total employed
9. Unemployed
10. Looking for first job
11. Others looking for work
12. Looking for employment
13. Total labor force
14. Other persons available for work under special conditions

Source: Breakdown based on ISTAT statistics.

The fact that is underscored here is that, while we were talking of the production explosion of the hidden economy, we can say that hidden work--which is only one aspect of it--kept diminishing. One might object that, in spite of the improvements made, not even the new ISTAT survey manages fully to record some forms of temporary work, especially the home worker. This has been admitted by the ISTAT itself regarding home work while it forcefully challenges the arguments regarding other forms of temporary work. The observation in any case does not get us anywhere. We are not dealing here with the exactness of a level of temporary employment but rather with the development which, as such, should be revealed also in the case in which the level has been underestimated, unless we want to attribute a possibly exclusive increase to home work, to work by minors and by foreign workers.

The question is of essential importance and should be studied on a higher level of territorial and sector breakdown--something which is not possible here and in which by the way we would encounter limitations in terms of data availability. We can therefore advance two conflicting assumptions. According to the first assumption--which partly ties in with the earlier objection--reluctance to admit temporary work might have increased along with temporary work; the kind of attention which this situation has been getting in the newspapers could as a matter of fact have increased the fears of individuals regarding income tax investigations.

Or we might advance another assumption to the effect that the expansion of the hidden economy and hidden work took place during the first half of the seventies, whereas a process of consolidation took shape during the second half which caused a certain emersion precisely at a time when the phenomenon assumes significance in the newspapers. But in that way we would explain only the decline in the industrial sector whereas, as we have seen, temporary work is spread out over all sectors.

#### Population Factors and Labor Supply

Between 1977 and 1980, there was a 3.53-percent increase in the labor force, in other words, more than the population increase, which was 3.40 percent. Employment grew however only 3.04 percent, in other words, less than the labor force and that in turn caused an increase of 9.8 percent in the number of unemployed. Now, an increase in the labor supply greater than the increase in the population of employable age (in other words, an increase in the activity rate) can depend on two factors:

(a) A factor of the demographic type, in other words, an objective factor. There can thus be a change in the age-group distribution of the population so that those age groups, which reveal a specific activity rate that is higher than the national average, would carry greater weight;

(b) A factor of the behavioral type, in other words, a subjective factor, consisting of an increase in the activity rates in the various age groups. The two factors can work in the same direction or in the opposite direction.

In this case we have the second assumption which turned out to be true: The change in the age group distribution of the population has had a negative effect, in



other words, the population increased more in the less active age groups. In other terms, if the specific activity rates had remained constant, the labor force (Table 4) would have gone up 2.47 percent, in other words, less than the active population and above all less than the employment level as such, something which would have brought about a decline in unemployment. But what we had instead was an increase in the specific activity rates which brought about a real increase in the labor force by 3.53 percent.

Table 4. Percentage Increase (1980 as Compared to 1977) in the Population and the Labor Supply, by Sex

		Maschi (1)	Femmine (2)	Maschi e femmine (3)
Popolazione	(4)	3.56	3.25	3.40
Occupazione	(5)	1.37	6.87	3.04
Forza di lavoro	(6)	1.59	7.63	3.53
* Forza di lavoro ipotetica	(7)	2.68	2.03	2.47

Key: 1--men; 2--women; 3--men and women; 4--population; 5--employment; 6--labor force; 7--hypothetical labor force\*; \*Here we show the increase in the labor supply which would have materialized merely as a result of the changes in the age group distribution of the population, assuming specific activity rates to be constant in each age group. Source: Breakdown based on ISTAT data.

This conclusion runs counter to current opinion which blames the increase in unemployment on factors of a demographic nature. In reality, at least over the past 4 years, the exact opposite happened; the demographic tendencies promoted and expansion in employment. The increase in unemployment however is due to the more massive presence, on the labor market, of population of employable age, whose behavior tends to line up with the behavior of the labor supply in other industrial countries. Facing an expanding labor supply however we have an economic system which, in the midst of a production boom, nevertheless is unable to guarantee growing employment at least equal to population growth.

#### Differences Between Men and Women

During the period under investigation, female employment grew more than male employment, not only in percentage terms (6.8 percent as against 1.4 percent) but also in terms of absolute value (417,000 as against 191,000). It thus becomes worthwhile to repeat the operation performed earlier regarding the overall labor force and to look into the differences in the development of male and female labor supply.

The male labor force increased 1.59 percent, in other words, less than the population, whose increase was 3.56 percent. The increase in the labor force, although less than the population increase, was greater than the increase in employment and

in this case likewise, in spite of the limited growth in the labor supply, there has been an increase in unemployment. As we can see from Table 4, the lesser growth in the labor supply as compared to the population is determined not only by a shift in the population's age group distribution toward the age groups that are less active but also by a drop in the specific activity rates.

Among the women, the labor force went up 7.63 percent, in other words, more than the female population of employable age, whose increase was 3.25 percent; but the employment increase, although significant, was not sufficient to prevent an increase in unemployment, to a greater extent than among men. As in the case of the men, to an even greater extent as a matter of fact, the population shifted toward less active age groups. But the high growth in the activity rate caused an increase in the labor force which was more than double the growth of the population of employable age.

Summarizing, we can say this: Male employment grew in a very moderate fashion and less than the population but both the different distribution of the population and a drop in the activity rates are factors that work against a growth in the labor force which, under similar conditions of labor demand stagnation, would have brought about a major increase in unemployment, which instead was held down. Among women, on the other hand, employment grew more than the population but--while the change in the age group distribution in favor of those less active promotes a lesser expansion in the labor force--the rise in the activity rates was so strong as to cause a growth in unemployment likewise.

The analysis was not made for the period of time prior to 1977; these are probably not new phenomena in view of the fact that the increase in female labor supply goes back to 1973. But this and the fact that such phenomena manifest themselves in such a marked fashion, indicates that profound changes are taking place on the labor market which deserve more detailed examination.

We have seen that both employment and unemployment among women went up; but the only thing is that unemployment went up among girls whereas employment grew also in the middle age groups. There seems to have been a movement running counter to the movement during the preceding decade when above all married women with children were driven out of the labor market. As a matter of fact, employment among women of marriageable age went up only 3.6 percent against 11.1 percent for married women. The increase in the female labor supply therefore seems to be influenced by a large number of factors, such as greater difficulty in adjusting the family unit budgets so as to achieve a certain improvement in child care services. On the other hand, there are subjective factors, such as the awareness of the impossibility of the liberation of women without emancipation in terms of labor.

#### Territorial Differences

Overall employment grew more in the south than in the north-central section (Table 5) and in both sections more for the women than for the men.



Table 5. Percentage Increase (1980 as against 1977) in Labor Supply and Population, by Sex and Category Breakdown

	(1) Maschi		(2) Femmine		Maschi & (3) femmine	
	centro nord (4)	sud (5)	centro nord (4)	sud (5)	centro nord (4)	sud (5)
Popolazione (6)	3.4	4.0	3.2	3.4	3.3	3.7
Occupati (7)	1.2	1.7	5.8	10.0	2.7	3.9
Forza di lavoro (8)	0.9	2.9	6.0	11.6	2.8	5.5
Persone in cerca di occupaz. (9)	-4.2	20.5	8.3	18.4	2.3	19.3

Key: 1--men; 2--women; 3--men and women; 4--north-central; 5--south; 6--population; 7--employed; 8--labor force; 9--persons looking for jobs. Source: Breakdown based on ISTAT data.

The male labor supply pressure declined in the north-central section although it went up less than the population as a whole; a very slight expansion in employment therefore was sufficient to cause a decline in the number of unemployed. In the south likewise, the male labor supply increased less than the population (but more than in the north-central section); consequently, an increase in employment, although slightly greater than what we had in the north-central area, did not turn out to be sufficient to prevent a growth in unemployment which came to a good 20.5 percent.

The female labor supply in the north-central section increased more than the population, 6 percent; a significant increase in employment however did not help prevent an increase in unemployment. In the south, on the other hand, the female labor supply went up 11.6 percent, almost double when compared to the north-central section; an increase in employment by 10 percent was not sufficient to prevent a growth of unemployment amounting to 18.4 percent, less than the male figure in the south, but higher than the female figure in the north-central section.

The trends on the labor market therefore run in the same direction for both sexes in both subdivisions. The only thing is that it is more accentuated in the south, something which raises by no means minor interpretative problems. For example, the low growth rate of male occupation in the north-central section could signify a certain labor supply saturation, at least in some segments, to which the enterprises should have responded by resorting to female labor. But the same phenomenon can be seen in the south, in a more accentuated fashion, and here the same explanation will not work.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. V. Siesto, "The information content of new disclosures on the labor market," QUADERNI DI ECONOMIA DEL LAVORO [Labor Economy Notebooks], No 8, 1979.

2. S.v., "Child Labor in Italy," *ECONOMIA DEL LAVORO* [Labor Economy], Nos 1-2, 1980; T. Perna, "A Case of Black-Market Labor--Child Labor in Reggio Calabria," *QUADERNI DI FABBRICA E STATO* [Factory and Government Notebooks], No 8, Rosenberg and Sellier, Turin, 1979.
3. CENSIS [Social Investment Study Center], "I lavoratori stranieri in Italia" [Foreign Workers in Italy], Government Printing Institute and Mint, 1979.
4. The term: unemployed, when not given in quotation marks, refers to all persons looking for jobs.
5. There are however overlaps because it is impossible to derive from the occasional and regular employed the share of undeclared employed in the various age groups.
6. See also L. Capriolo, E. Luccatelli, N. Pratesi, "Il lavoro sbagliato" [The Wrong Kind of Work], Rosenberg and Sellier, Turin, 1980, and various articles published in the magazine *INCHIESTA*.

3058

CSO: 3104/282

## SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY SHOWS FURTHER RECOVERY

The Hague ALGEMEEN NEDERLANDS PERSBUREAU in English 4 Jun 81 p 1

[Text] Vlaardingen, June 3--The Dutch shipbuilding industry recovered further last year with sales rising to 4.2 billion guilders from 3.9 billion in 1979, the shipbuilders' association Cebosine said in its annual report today.

Exports rose by 0.2 billion to 1.7 billion guilders and order books at the end of the year were 1.6 billion, or 300 million guilders higher than 12 months earlier.

The association said it was the first volume increase in order books since 1978. In all 89 vessels were ordered in 1980, a rise of 15 over the previous year. The average tonnage of the vessels ordered rose from 19,000 to 22,000 tonnes.

The report said that the industry's skies were not cloudless but Dutch shipbuilders could improve their market position by concentrating on building sophisticated vessels. Innovation was therefore a prime pre-requisite.

The Dutch shipbuilding industry has been recovering slowly since 1978 and the demand for vessels is expected to increase further after 1983 so that a pre-crisis level could be reached around 1987, the report said.

## Innovation

The extent by which the Netherlands could profit from the rise in demand depended on the measure this country could keep in step with innovation, cost developments and productivity in the world shipbuilding industry.

The number of workers employed in the Dutch shipbuilding industry fell by 1,400 last year to 34,400. On the other side there are many vacancies, especially for skilled tradesmen.

Mr K. Fibbe, deputy chairman of a tripartite committee which helped channel the reorganization of the Dutch shipbuilding industry in the 1970s, told the annual meeting that government support should be phased out in the next three years.

A Cebosine spokesman said shipbuilders were agreed in principle with this recommendation. 'The shipbuilding industry feels strong enough to take the lead in further adjustments which are to be made,' he added.

After a period of yard closures and retrenchments, due to a world-wide shipping and shipbuilding crisis, the Dutch industry is now implementing a 500-million-guilder modernisation programme.

CSO: 3120/60

## SAAB INVITED BY LARGE BUILDERS TO JOIN AIRCRAFT PROJECT

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 1 Jun 81 p 21

[Article by Helena Stalnert: "Race for a New Civil Aircraft--SAAB Invited by Aircraft Giants"]

[Text] SAAB may enter in the manufacture of a new 150-passenger civilian aircraft. Boeing, McDonnell Douglas and Airbus have all contacted SAAB. Which one the cooperating partner will be is to be disclosed this year.

"It is probably the last large civil aircraft order in our time. Therefore we are naturally very interested," said Tore Gullstrand, managing director of SAAB's aircraft division.

Growing shuttle service and increased domestic traffic have caused the world's airline companies to look for a medium-sized aircraft with places for 150-160 passengers. Tore Gullstrand estimates that the large companies will need about 2,500 such aircraft during the next 20 years.

## Three Competitors

For the present there are three groups of aircraft manufacturers which have developed aircraft of this size. They are Boeing, world's largest aircraft manufacturer; McDonnell Douglas, which together with Dutch Fokker is developing such a plane; and Airbus, a consortium of French, West German, British and Spanish interests which sees such an aircraft as one of the future possibilities.

All three groups are now trying to interest the Japanese to go into aircraft manufacture. And all three are having discussions with SAAB.

"I do not believe that all three are going to go ahead with this type of aircraft," said Tore Gullstrand. But for now he will not say which of the three groups may be SAAB's cooperating partner.

If SAAB enters in such a project, that would be a further step toward increased civil aircraft manufacture. SAAB already cooperates with the Americans in the manufacture of the 30-passenger SAAB Fairchild. Before the development of that project they received a loan of 350 million kronor from the Swedish government. The new project may also require government support.

"It is a matter of development costs totaling 5-10 billion kronor. How large our share may be I can not yet say. But it could in any case be necessary to obtain support such as we received on the Fairchild project," said Tore Gullstrand.

If the European Airbus should be SAAB's cooperating partner, government participation would be a prerequisite, since the Airbus already has an overlapping organization based on government support by member countries.

#### Waiting for SAS

At SAAB they also want to know which aircraft SAS will decide on. Today SAS has 60 DC-9s, with capacities of 108-120 passengers each, which must be replaced by 1990 at the latest. The declining market has caused earlier plans to begin replacing them in 1983 to be deferred.

Director Bjorn Tornblom of SAS said, "We have not yet taken a position." According to his judgment, however, it is Fokker/McDonnell and Airbus who are farthest ahead in developing a modern aircraft of just that size.

SAS does not consider it decisive whether SAAB participates in the manufacture. But during the purchase of the larger Airbus, SAS pointed out that in the future they would prefer to see Airbus cooperating with SAAB.

"We are a Scandinavian company, and prefer to cooperate with other Scandinavian companies," said Bjorn Tornblom.

#### Decided in the United States

The final decision by SAS on the question will have great importance for which of the three manufacturing groups will win the competition. Especially if in working out the specifications there is cooperation with Dutch KLM, Swiss Swissair and French UTA.

But probably this time the American companies Delta and United Airlines will have the most influence on the decision. They have already worked out specifications for what they want in a 150-passenger aircraft. The aircraft manufacturer which gets their order will have great influence on developments. The decision on this order will probably come this year.

But whichever it is, all three groups are ready to begin manufacture with very short notice. Whether or not SAAB is going to participate as manufacturer of one more civil aircraft may also be decided this year.

9287

CSO: 3109/199



## TINDEMANS ON 'MALAISE' OF FLEMISH SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY

Brussels LE SOIR in French 6 Jun 81 pp 1, 2

[Article by Social Christian Party Chairman Leo Tindemans: "The Troubles of the Social Christian Party"]

[Text] Here is what some newspapers wrote: The CVP [Social Christian Party] is in trouble right now. I am not going to deny that; it is true. On the contrary, I want to make sure that this situation is made known because good information always helps prevent confusion.

Now, what is this all about? Let us not forget that the Belgian franc in March was the object of international speculation and that somehow there was no determination in Belgium to restore the budget situation and the balance of payments so that people drew the conclusion that the country was going down the drain. Premier Wilfried Martens tells us that, to support the Belgian franc the National Bank had to intervene on Friday, 27 March, to the tune of 15 billions. That was the largest amount ever involved in this kind of transaction in a single day since the end of the war. We do not know what happened at the Maastricht summit but we have been able to see for ourselves that the premier, upon his return, had changed his outlook; he wanted to meet the leaders of the National Bank, the budget, planning and index specialists, and in the end he came up with the proposition involving three points: The indexing system, salaries, and prices. But his plan was not met with approval in the eyes of his ministers and the chairmen of the coalition parties did not find any common grounds for agreement among themselves either. That caused the crisis.

Nevertheless, those who judge the value of our currency at home and abroad do not wait for the end of a crisis nor the results of an election. With nothing settled, prepared, or resolved, the responsibility of politicians was terrible. We faced a choice in the CVP: We could either ask the country to express itself clearly on the economic, financial or budget policy to be pursued, with the risk of a devaluation prior to a new policy being implemented; or we could accept a replacement of the current cabinet, with a different premier and a different finance minister. This was a rather tough choice because the leading party authorities supported the Martens plan.

After careful consideration, the CVP agreed to support the Eyskens cabinet "for the sake of the country's higher interest." This phrase was used twice, the first time during the investiture debate, the second time on the occasion of our congress at Zwevegem.

The "higher interest" was the value of the franc, the purchasing power of the low-income-earner, the hope for a dynamic economic policy, the credibility of the Belgium whose reputation was seriously tarnished.

The administrative was able to start off on the basis of its predecessor's program, including a declaration of intention which hinted at the best and the worst. It potentially contains all possibilities for giving Belgium a free-enterprise orientation which could save it in the end. Where there is a will, there is a way.

We are now at the beginning of June and the administration is exclusively concerned with the problem of the steel industry or, more particularly the merger of the Liege and Charleroi basins. Far be it from me to entertain the idea of underestimating the economic, budgetary, and social gravity of this problem. But the ministerial negotiations have led neither to national recovery, nor to a new economic determination, nor to a social solidarity geared toward the future. An "agreement" was produced in a climate of blackmail and haggling--an "agreement" of which nobody could say today where it would lead us tomorrow.

And what about the Belgian franc? This problem obviously is temporarily eclipsed by other concerns. Fundamentally however nothing has changed. There is no real budget recovery, in spite of the fact that the experts have announced a deficit of more than 200 billions in current expenditures, not to mention the deficit in the balance of payments.

The CVP is suffering from this situation. It seeks to bear government responsibility for the entire country. Its past record as a national party, its true vocation, its reason for existence are to contribute to governing the country well.

It must unfortunately observe that its analyses, its criticisms and its complaints do not give rise to any change in policy or absence of policy. It would like to prevent the catastrophe, it would like to put an end to deadly indebtedness, to prepare the way to a better future, to fight effectively against unemployment, to govern so as to give new hope, because a democracy which does not arouse hope, which does not call upon the young people, will inevitably be the victim of collapse. It would like to implement a serious policy of fighting against the crisis, it would like to activate all energies which are still slumbering in our midst, it wants to encourage the dynamic forces, those who do not capitulate, in other words, it wants to extricate Belgium from its current depression.

And what does it find instead? In spite of the will, the plans, and the proposals of the CVP, the country is becoming more and more bogged down in a desperate situation of inaction and it is very active only when it comes to printing money. That is the cause of the trouble which certain observers are now detecting in the CVP. It is real; it is palpable and it is serious.

5058

CSO: 3100/782

## DEV-IS SIGNS COMMUNIQUE WITH GREEK CYPRIOTS

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 19 May 81 p 1

[Text] Nicosia -- DEV-IS [Federation of Revolutionary Worker Unions] reportedly signed a joint communique in Moscow with the PEO, Greek unions and other supporters. Yesterday's Greek Cypriot press gave the following information, in part, on the reported communique:

"Six union organizations from Cyprus and Greece, including DEV-IS, signed a joint communique on Cyprus in Moscow. The communique states, among other things, that the Cyprus problem could be resolved through adherence to the UN resolutions and the principles on which unity of view was reached in the Denktas-Makaros and Denktas-Kyprianou summit agreements. The communique also said that a federal, united and independent state could be formed on Cyprus and that, in addition to the removal of foreign troops from the island, foreign bases should be stripped from island lands as well.

"The communique was signed by the Cypriot organizations DEV-IS, PEO and the Pan-Cyprian Federation of Independent Trade Unions and the Greek organizations Antidictatorial Labor Front, United Antidictatorial Labor Movement and Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union Movement which had all gathered in Moscow for a meeting on 'Monopolies.' The communique stressed that no point of disagreement exists between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, that the disagreements created have the purpose of serving imperialist goals and providing them the opportunity for developments along the lines of the interests of the monopolies in the Middle East. The communique also calls for discussion of Cyprus' international problems at an international conference to be convened under UN auspices and supports positive steps toward the realization of diplomatic relations between the two communities, bearing in mind the mutual advantage of such relations. Finally, the six union organizations resolve to promote contacts on labor and union topics."

8349

CSO: 4907/281

## ELECTIONEERING CONTINUES IN TFSC

## Ozgur Charges Denktas With Divisiveness

Nicosia BOZKURT in Turkish 23 May 81 pp 1, 4

[Text] Nicosia -- RTP [Republican Turkish Party] General Chairman Ozker Ozgur charged TFSC President Rauf Denktas with a call to divide the community into fronts. Responding to Denktas' statements which appeared in our newspaper yesterday, Ozker Ozgur contended that Denktas had used the declaration which DEV-IS [Federation of Revolutionary Worker Unions] signed in Moscow with Greek Cypriot and Greek labor unionists as a pretext for attacking the opposition in his usual way. Ozgur said:

"Denktas went a step farther in his attack this time, saying, 'The nationalist front must rally quickly,' and clearly setting forth his intention to divide the community into fronts.

"The substance of both the declaration which DEV -IS signed in Moscow and the one signed in Sofia by the RTP and the CLP [Communal Liberation Party] is the desire to find an early and just solution in keeping with the Denktas-Makarios and Denktas-Kyprianou agreements. Why is Denktas so nervous when mention is made of these agreements which he personally signed? Why do the agreements which bear the signatures of Denktas, Makarios and Kyprianou throw Denktas into such a tizzy? Or do the Denktas-Makarios and Denktas-Kyprianou agreements remind Denktas of other agreements concealed from the community which he does not want to think about?

"That the external aspect of the Cyprus problem related to the British bases should be taken up in an international conference is one view.

"The 5 November 1976 resolution by the Federal Assembly envisages removal of the bases from the island anyway. Instead of demanding removal of the British bases from the island in keeping with the Assembly resolution, Rauf Denktas throws a fit every time the subject is raised. If Denktas is opposed to discussion of the British bases at such a conference, he should say so. If he continues to 'fan the flames of British friendship' as he said in his book 'Cyprus at Five Minutes Till Noon,' he ought not to call this throwing mud at the opposition, but honestly say, 'I do not put the interests of Cyprus first, but the interests of the West in Cyprus.'"



## Cagatay Claims NUP Will Govern Alone

Nicosia HALKIN SESI in Turkish 25 May 81 p 3

[Article based on interview with Prime Minister, NUP Chairman Cagatay by HALKIN SESI's Sami Tasarkan]

[Text] National Unity Party NUP] General Chairman Mustafa Cagatay said in answer to HALKIN SESI's first question that, because of public interest shown in the party, he was hopeful about the 28 June elections as to their winning power alone.

Cagatay expressed his views on the June 1981 elections as follows: "When the interest which our people are showing lately in the NUP is taken into account, it gives us hope that the NUP will be able to come to power alone. Even though our party has been through certain difficulties and hardships in the past 5 years, I hope that it will be able to get the support of the community again by explaining to the community the reasons for what they did and did not do and that it will have the opportunity to govern with this community support."

### No Coalition

Stating that he did not believe it possible to say much about coalition, Cagatay said he believed it was necessary from the standpoint of community interests for the NUP to govern alone and repeated that the NUP would come to power alone.

### Denktas Will Be Elected

Answering our question about whether the presidential election would go to the second ballot, Cagatay said that such a thing definitely would not happen and continued as follows:

"It is only natural that the esteemed president should be elected with a large majority as a person who is known and loved for his service to the community and for what he has done for the community and with this community to date."

### We Favor Peace

We asked, "What will your party's internal and foreign policy be after the June 1981 elections?" NUP General Chairman Cagatay replied: "I do not think there will be any change in our party's policy. Policy to date has been pursued within a peaceful attitude. This policy will be continued as is. As a government which the party supported, we favored the talks. We believe it is necessary to get results through these talks. And we believe that the interests of Cyprus, as well as of the Turkish Cypriot community depend on this. So I would hope that the Greek Cypriots would make a change in the attitude they have held to date and be in a position to answer the good will and understanding we have shown and that it will be possible after the elections to obtain results from these talks in keeping with the facts and conditions of Cyprus."

## No Refugee Problem

Cagatay said that there was no refugee problem for us and that the equal property law had been largely implemented.

The ruling party chairman expressed his views on the equal property law as follows:

"Full implementation of the equal property law will be possible through the measures we have already taken and the measures which we will take, the measures we will take after the elections. Therefore, the TPSC citizens who have settled here will have a full and happy life. There should be no problems at all very soon after the elections. I believe this."

## Economy and Monetary Policy

NUP General Chairman Cagatay gave the following answer to our question about the economy and monetary policy: "I remember that we announced following certain Council of Ministers meetings that we had taken up economic matters in general and had devised a stabilization program in connection with economic matters. And our efforts on this program are continuing following the contacts with Mr Zeyyat Baykara. Monetary policy also comes under this program. Our goal is to take a look at all economic matters and quickly put into practice a program including these matters, taking into account the relationships they have with each other. We have not yet planned which parts of it we will apply before the elections and which after. If we have to do this, we will make an announcement later."

## Choose the Best Cadre

Cagatay sends the following message to the electorate via HALKIN SESİ: "I hope the 28 June elections will be a great and wonderful day for the community and the Turkish Cypriot nation. I hope the electorate will vote for the cadre which can serve the community. I thank HALKIN SESİ for this opportunity to convey my best wishes to the community."

## Durduran Explains Platform, Stresses NUP Weaknesses

Nicosia HALKIN SESİ in Turkish 26 May 81 p 3

[Article based on interview with CLP Chairman Alpay Durduran by HALKIN SESİ's Sami Tasarkan]

[Text] CLP General Chairman Alpay Durduran told us in response to our first question in the interview with him that in all probability the NUP would be unable to come to power alone. Durduran said that, on the other hand, they had a good chance of coming to power. "We, as a party, hope to double the number of our national deputies. I do not want to take a chance on naming a figure, but I believe we will win big," he said.

## Coalition Unavoidable

Noting that they would be able to form a coalition primarily with the opposition parties, CLP Chairman Durduran said, "There is no need to come to power alone in multiparty democracies, and I still believe that our people have the ability to



govern with coalitions. Therefore, I believe in using all the resources which a multiparty democracy affords and in not ignoring any of them. However, our condition is to be able to form a coalition in which we could keep the promises we made to the people during the elections." We then asked: "Does this mean you could not form a coalition with the NUP?" Durduran replied, "We will not ignore any possibility."

#### Presidential Election to Second Ballot

We asked about their fielding a presidential candidate as a party and how they viewed the candidates' chances. Durduran said they thought their candidate could get a large number of votes, but that neither candidate would get over 51 percent on the first ballot. Durduran, pointing out that they saw the second ballot as a Denktas-Rizki contest, said they would support any opposition candidate if their candidate did not make it to the second ballot.

#### Election Law Needs Change

Noting that the 1976 law on elections and public voting had been prepared according to the conditions of the time and was considered out of date today, Durduran said that certain drawbacks have emerged.

Durduran listed these drawbacks as follows: "For example, there are no conditions for candidacy. Everybody can be a candidate. Registration is not required for forming a party and participating in the elections. I believe that certain measures should be taken whereby they should be registered. I also feel that the elections and public voting law goes into too much detail in this respect. I therefore think it would be appropriate to cut out a few of these details and give the Supreme Electoral Council a chance to work. In this way, the Supreme Electoral Council could make adjustments according to current circumstances through regulations or resolutions. This is necessary."

#### Period of Accounting

Durduran pointed out that the first thing they would do when they came to power or to a flank of power would be to establish an effective state administration and said that this was an inalienable condition for domestic and foreign policy and that they would launch a period of accounting to do this.

#### Refugees Will Be Landed

Durduran explained their domestic policy as follows: "The refugee problems are a part of the overall problems. First of all, we will definitely guarantee the rights of the refugees to the orchards and vineyards which they have under production. As we have long claimed, the state has the authority in these matters. We will solve all these problems and make our refugees able to rehabilitate themselves."

#### Currency Procedure

"We see that Cypriot currency is being used as the unit of account today. We will begin to use it as the only unit of account and will make Turkish currency a currency used only in cash on the market. In this way, we will place all units of

account and all circulation conducted by check and other valuable paper in terms of Cypriot currency. We will thus have done a lot to save ourselves from the constant loss of value of Turkish currency. We will undertake a serious study as to whether Cypriot currency may also be used as cash, bearing in mind political developments in the Cyprus problem, if we can reduce the balance of payments to acceptable levels. If our initiatives come to naught, we will take the route of printing our own currency.

#### Tourism

"Tourism is a very important area. It is an area in which we can make real strides. In order to resolve the problems here, we will solve the transportation problem, which is also very important for other sectors. This solution will be realized only by obtaining our own air service. We want to resolve this problem quickly by arranging charter flights in addition to flights with International Air Transport Association fares. After this, we will definitely find remedies by setting up a company in Turkey and starting flights with summer fares with the TK [expansion unknown] code.

#### Industry

"There is a great deal of idle capacity in industry. We will take immediate measures to revitalize and provide for the use of capacity at Industrial Holding and other economic enterprises.

#### Housing

"Available resources will be used, not in word but in deed, to get on top of the housing problem. The need for land will be opened up quickly and land will be given to citizens by the state. Types of construction will be assessed immediately and measures will be introduced to prevent the selection of types of housing which are expensive and even more expensive as to maintenance. Great opportunities will be provided those who build orderly housing in compliance with the standards. The use of solar energy will be stressed. There is a particularly large housing shortage in the villages. [To solve] this, land surrounding the villages will be given irrevocably to the citizens."

#### Practical Measures

Alpay Durduran said that practical measures in foreign policy were unavoidable, pointing out that contact with those who support the Turkish proposals was unavoidable.

Durduran said in this regard: "An end will be put to the Greek Cypriot administration's use of propaganda to show our just cause as unjust. There will be an administration in The Turkish Cypriot community which is realistic and only wants its rights. We believe that we will see the impact of this. We are in favor of practical measures which can be applied in foreign policy in advance of a concrete and political solution. We will win effectiveness in foreign policy by identifying every possibility and opportunity that we can think of and developing them into a program and then informing our friends of them, putting them forward

in the form of a package and defending them with the support of our friends. The goal, of course, is to establish a Federal Republic."

Asking that the public not forget that the 28 June elections are democratic elections, Durduran suggested that all public discussion should be considered normal and that no lid should be put on these discussions. He said:

"I hope that no one forgets that after this election atmosphere is over and done with we will still be living together in unity as Turkish Cypriots and that everyone acts accordingly."

8349

CSO: 4907/280

**ERKKI LIIKANEN FAVORED TO WIN PARTY SECRETARYSHIP IN SDP CONGRESS DUEL**

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 3 Jun 81 p 7

[Article by Jan-Anders Ekstrom: "SDP Party Secretary Election--Duel Between Friends on Best Terms"]

[Text] Marianne Laxen, 35, and Erkki Liikanen, 30, are fighting for the post of party secretary at the 32nd Social Democratic Party (SDP) Congress, which begins today. It is a duel between two good friends who see no political lines of difference between themselves, and who agree to conduct the duel in a clean and positive manner and without fear of a decisive vote.

Despite the political harmony--in each case based on the politically lively 60's-- it is a case of two very different personalities with different personal backgrounds.

Marianne Laxen comes from a fairly nonpolitical Finno-Swedish home. She was engaged in civic activities while still in school and joined the Social Democratic Party in 1965 after having, among other things, participated in the founding of a social democratic student group in Helsinki. Then she worked in the government's Office of Equality for 6 years, and for 2 years has been the secretary general of the Organization of Social Democratic Women. She has a bachelor's degree in political science with majors in social policy and national economy.

A divorced mother of three, she lives in Esbo Mattby, and is a member of the Esbo Southern Labor Union.

"Manne" received her political education mainly in the Swedish Labor Union of Finland, which is the Swedish-speaking branch of the SDP. She has been an official of the union, and at one time was the vice chairman.

Swedish-speaking Marianne Laxen has no difficulty with the Finnish language. She has always worked in jobs requiring both languages, and has documents showing that she is qualified in Finnish.

## Record Young Riksdag Member

Erkki Liikanen comes from St Michel where he grew up in a working environment. He became a social democrat from his home background--his father was, among other things, a member of the St Michel city council. As a 15-year-old "Eki" became a member of SDP, and was active in the social democratic community organization. His political career began in 1973. In 1971 he was chairman for the Finnish-speaking student association Teiniliitto, and in 1973 he was elected, while only 21, to the Riksdag, a record which is surely difficult to beat. He has been an officer in the SDP since 1975, and during the past 2 years he has worked with the members of the Riksdag in the party office as a kind of acting party secretary.

As does Laxen, Liikanen has a bachelor's degree with a major in national economy. He has a wife and two daughters. Riksdagsman Liikanen, who is also considered to be very clever with words, speaks excellent Swedish despite his entirely Finnish upbringing. He made his first Swedish acquaintances at 18, but that was after his Nordic contacts in the party and the Riksdag made him aware of the importance of the Swedish language.

Laxen and Liikanen see no political differences between themselves, other than their different personal styles. During their campaigns out in the SDP field it sometimes arises that Laxen is regarded as the candidate of the party's Left, while Liikanen is supported more by adherents of the official party line and the Right. This is not an entirely just depiction, however. For example in the Abo area the Left supported Liikanen, while the remainder--the majority--supported Laxen.

## 'Mistake to Characterize'

Neither of the two agree with this political characterization. Marianne Laxen believes it is wrong to characterize party members in this way. She sees herself as "a social democrat among all the others who want the party's principles to become reality." She admits, however, that she is somewhat marked by the labor union, which has of course been known for promoting a relatively radical line within the SDP. Furthermore, she believes that "if one is a social democrat, one is also on the Left."

Erkki Liikanen admits that he is easily identified with the current party leadership, since he participated in carrying out the "gray work." However, he does not think that it is exactly fair that within the party people tend to see Laxen as the spokesman for "the new" and himself as the representative for "the old" line. He points out that in the proposition for domestic policy there are many new ideas which he participated in forming.

On the whole Liikanen believes that he has "grown in the same direction as the party" and that there are no longer the clear divisions of before. Besides, Marianne Laxen represents the existing party leadership in her position as secretary general of the women's movement.



#### Riksdag Member or Not

As to their views of the job of party secretary, Laxen and Liikanen differ to some degree. Marianne Laxen believes that the job of party secretary as such is entirely enough for one person. According to her the party secretary should not be a member of the Riksdag at the same time, even though "others could have a different view." Liikanen has a different opinion on this matter. According to him it is important that there are those in the party leadership who put their positions at stake in general elections. "In this way one's character gains humility..."

As party secretary Marianne Laxen would stand for a Riksdag election only if she "were forced" to do so. If she became party secretary she would continue her job in the SDP women's movement. In principle she does not feel called upon to stand for election as long as the election system emphasizes the individual as heavily as it does at present. The best would be a system with so-called long lists, dealing with collective candidacies.

The two candidates also have somewhat different viewpoints as to practical party work. Marianne Laxen will work to activate party members so that these in turn will effectively influence the people around them. She seeks a more disciplined activity leading to changes in society--less "playing chess" as is common today with tactical "give and take" as the main ingredients in politics. Furthermore, Laxen strongly emphasizes the collective leadership within the party--decisions should be made together.

#### 'A More Open SDP Profile'

Erkki Liikanen wants to give SDP a more open and many-faceted profile on the outside at the same time as the internal debate over basic political questions intensifies. According to Liikanen it is especially fundamental to improve contacts between the party and outside groups and persons. This is said without any disparagement for the important field work.

#### 'Progressive Center is Lacking'

On the matter of the future of the SDP's policies on government and cooperation, both Laxen and Liikanen are critical of the Center Party. The whole question has developed to the point that the Center Party has acquired too much influence. According to Laxen the parties of the Left should blame themselves for giving the Center Party full power to use the strength of the Conservative Party in the Riksdag. There must be an end to this overrepresentation of the Center Party. "It is a battle which must be taken up," said Marianne Laxen. "If the Center Party wants to be a progressive party in the center it will have to prove it. And we demand that they must..."

According to Laxen the Conservative Party is not an alternative to cooperation with the Center Party. She would rather see the bourgeois parties try to govern alone.

It need not be especially difficult for the Left to have a majority in the Riksdag "if the parties of the Left could only function a little better," she said. In



that connection she notes that it is a burden for the party that the prime minister is a social democrat with a predominant non-socialist majority in the Riksdag and the government. Because of this the party has to take the responsibility for many unfortunate rulings.

Liikanen also said that it is not self-evident that the government is cooperating with the Center Party. The incessant support for the parties in the center-left coalition since 1966--more exactly for most except the SDP--in conjunction with the declining desires of the non-socialist parties to reform "forces a reevaluation" of the situation. According to Liikanen the SDP can be expected to adopt a policy in which more than previously they take one thing at a time. SDP can not approve of a center policy more dominated by the Right. Liikanen said that it is deplorable that we today lack a progressive liberal center.

#### 'Little Liberality Remains in SDP'

Liikanen and Laxen both look positively on the Swedish People's Party as a future coalition party. "A sliver" of the traditional liberality remains in the SDP, according to Laxen, and Liikanen notes in this connection especially the liberal views of the minister of justice on certain questions.

Both express the hope that the Swedish People's Party will, a little more often than previously, dare to advance a liberal policy instead of always finishing behind the position of the Center Party.

#### Women Going Ahead

The party secretary election will take place at the SDP congress either on Thursday evening or Friday. Laxen's candidacy has had unexpectedly strong support, but the question is whether she will seriously threaten Liikanen when it comes to a showdown. No matter what happens, her candidacy means that women now are getting greater attention than before for their demand for increased representation in the government of the party. The goal of the women's movement has been 35 percent of the seats in the party leadership. They will hardly get this far, but in any event they can expect a noticeable increase in representation.

9287

CSO: 3109/200

## CP CONGRESS APPROVES SWEEPING PERSONNEL CHANGES IN ORGANS

Helsinki SUOMEN KIVALEHTI in Finnish 29 May 81 pp 24-27

[Article by Pekka Vuoristo: "SKP Seeks Common Course: New Channel, Old Buoys"]

[Text] Unity was a subject for dispute at the Finnish Communist Party's (SKP) 19th Party Congress.

For a while it seemed as though the party was too badly split to even elect itself a chairman.

This congress was supposed to mark a decisive turning point and an important step toward the unification of the two political parties that have been functioning for 12 years under the watchwords of the SKP.

The party has reason for concern. Its activity is fading away and its mutual bickering is a source of constant delight to its opponents.

During a general discussion that lasted for over 12 hours this point surfaced often, for example, as follows:

"We have suffered crushing election defeats and have blamed one another for them. But we have not dared to look into the mirror because our guilt might have been revealed." (Benjamin Hampinen, Lapland)

"We will go to our graves without a new generation to follow us if this eternal squabbling continues." (Tuula Kemppainen, Satakunta)

"It is alarming that today a great deal of social protest is channeled past the communist movement and independently of it." (Marja-Liisa Salminen, Uusimaa)

"Doesn't the SKP have an alternative any more?" (Jouko Kajanoja, Central Committee)

The effort towards unity was a genuine one to many people. What went wrong?

Pressure and "Stalinist" Jargon

Unity has been repeatedly stressed. A significant step in that direction was the fact that the partners were able to agree on a joint Central Committee activity report which was unanimously approved.

Quite exceptional was the fact that decisions were not agreed on in advance, but were really left to the congress delegates to thrash out. The fact that, because of this, the congress stretched out for hours and hours beyond the scheduled time also demonstrated how unaccustomed they were to such a procedure.

On the other hand, the many familiar kinds of quarrels continued. In the usual way the "Stalinists" reserved the Koitto Temperance Society's meeting hall in case they should need it to march out of. The reason for this was to subject the congress to minority-faction pressure.

But the opposition was not openly offended, as was often the case before. However, word play was engaged in. Zealous majority members with harsh words criticized jointly formulated documents while zealous minority members adopted the usual "Stalinist" jargon as an unmistakable identifying feature.

What would one have to say about this, for example: "The promotion of unity implies... the strengthening of cooperation in the spirit of Marxist-Leninism and proletarian internationalism"? (Raimo Ojala, Turku)

And of course, majority and minority members differed as to which district organizations they represented. The chief disputes were engaged in and all choices were still made on the basis of that party split which had been contested three times.

Lenin Out of Favor?

The majority districts of Lapland, Kainuu, Oulu, Satakunta and Keski-Suomi were the most vociferous in demanding a change of party leadership at the top.

To be sure, party leaders managed to be on their toes. They pointed out that in speeches made by party leaders — and particularly in those made by "Stalinists," in which retention of the chairmanship was supported — the importance of the effort to educate members in ideals and ideology had been especially stressed. This is one of the eternal themes of communism, but there is a tendency for it to be stressed when the party leadership feels itself threatened. Those who demand change are thus ideologically speaking placed in a suspicious light.

Some shifty features were evident in the chairmanship issue. First of all, Aarne Saarinen's resignation was demanded chiefly so that they could get rid of Taisto Sinisalo. Elimination of the 15-year conflict was regarded as the primary prerequisite to cooperation.

When there is a change of leadership in the communist movement, it usually means that the retiring leaders fall "out of favor." How could the "Stalinists" agree to letting "the man who is carrying on the work of V.I. Lenin" and "is a creative Marxist," as the Soviet Communist Party's theoretical review KOMMUNISTI appropriately eulogized Taisto Sinisalo just before the SKP congress, fall out of favor in the eyes of the international communist movement?

Arvo Aalto was the rebels' favorite. In the eyes of the "Stalinists," however, as demonstrated in an article he recently wrote, he is a prisoner of "historical compromises" or cooperation between the Communists and "the national bourgeoisie," and this is what they had to say about the article:

"A historical compromise contains the reconciliation of an irreconcilable conflict inherent in a given proposal. At the level of practical politics, this means co-operation with the Employers Association and the Conservative Party." (Marja-Liisa Salminen)

#### No Sponsor Found

In order to be able to change the SKP leadership, there would have to be guarantees that true party unity can be achieved; otherwise, the new leadership would stumble into the same dispute.

The fact that the planned revolt failed in the end due to a lack of candidates shows that there were not sufficient guarantees to effect it. Arvo Aalto, Olavi Hanninen, Aarno Aitamurto and Seppo Toivainen, who had been referred to as the "Stalinists'" crown prince, did not want to act as sponsors for such an uncertain kind of change. That left Saarinen and Sinisalo.

The decision was a hard one. The majority districts had to vote on it; breathers in negotiations and rallies were held. Instead of integration, on this issue the party seemed to be breaking up into smaller splinter factions than before. They cracked jokes about the majority majority faction, the minority majority faction, the majority minority faction and the minority minority faction.

Meanwhile, it seemed that the SKP was altogether too strife-ridden to be capable of choosing chairmen for itself. They finally succeeded, but, in order to avoid a demonstration, the Central Committee felt it best to have them sing the "International," bring the congress to an end and send the delegates on their way before they dared to come to a decision.

Nevertheless, the delegates were not sent away quite emptyhanded. The Central Committee and the Political Bureau were stripped of their most conspicuous fighting cocks and, above all, of those officials who have thus far held the party in their hands.

In terms of SKP unification, the appointment of Maija-Liisa Halonen to the honorary post of second chairman can be regarded as an indication of a practice that is becoming more widespread among Finnish parties. Now the SKP too has its "own black" who can be put on display when the question of discrimination comes up.

#### Decision — and What Is It?

Two other central issues were the government and press issues.

In the general discussion, they got nowhere on the government issue. The congress delegates did not understand what they were saying to one another:

"In principle no difference of opinion prevails in the party districts on Communist participation in the government...." (Taisto Sinisalo)

"Some people are opposed to our participation in the government on the grounds of principle." (Jouko Kajanoja)



"There is no difference of opinion on the basis for the government, but there certainly is on its policy...." (Eino Laine, Turku)

"How could opponents of cooperation with the government know in advance that the policy shaped by the government would be unacceptable to the SKP?" (Sauli Majamäki, Vaasa)

The idea of a political document according to which the government, in which the SKP would participate, would "defend the interests and demands of the workers" and "take a stand against the efforts of big capital and the Right" shaped up as a common approach. According to this document, "in judging the success of government policy, development of the mass effect of the party must be regarded as an important criterion." They unanimously agreed that the SKP should "sharpen" its policy.

They cannot come to grips with these problems until they decide which policy will defend worker interests — which is precisely what they have been arguing about up to now. However, the immediate objectives listed in the document do not include the key to this question.

They will come to grips with their problems when they explain what is meant by "development of the mass effect of the party." Can it be calculated in terms of number of votes or are mass actions like demonstrations and strikes meant?

They already came to grips with their problems when each of them explained what "sharpening" means. Jouko Kajanoja alone found eight alternatives and an objection to each of them. All were plausible and, in the speaker's opinion, wrong anyway.

These are examples of the kinds of mines to be found in the political field on the road to real unity, if someone should want to set them off.

#### TIEDONANTAJA Exists and Will Continue to Do So

In the SKP the press issue is a central issue, simply because the "Stalinist" parallel organization is built up about the review TIEDONANTAJA. Without a solution to the press question they will not cease being a dual organization and, if they do not cease being one, it will really be pointless to talk of unity.

At the congress the "Stalinists" adopted a position in terms of which the party would have its own organ instead of "participating in the publication of a newspaper alongside of which non-Marxist as well as Marxist ideas can be propagated." (Urho Jokinen, chief editor of TIEDONANTAJA)

TIEDONANTAJA was, for example, reminded that: "It is indispensable for TIEDONANTAJA to stop being an advocate of its present line, a supporter of the party split and a fomenter of lack of discipline. It is one of the worst supporters of the parallel organization and a party split." (Timo Laaksonen, Satakunta)

The Laplanders have an idea that, under majority-faction conditions, the "Stalinist" ideological model would be a solution: TIEDONANTAJA would be taken into the party as its organ. This idea has not produced any echo since the "Stalinists" are not ready to give up their bastion.

The "Stalinists" brought the matter to a vote by demanding the founding of their own organ. However, the congress approved a stand in support of the KANSAN UUTIS position. At the same time the Central Committee was given the job of looking into the possibilities of improving their information service, which an optimist might interpret as leaving the door open to the generation of a solution.

#### Half Way

The revolt failed, the dispute continued to exist and many were embittered. Veikko Anttoni Heikkilä, that monumental Communist figure from Inari, expressed the feelings of those from the north when he bitterly asked the "Stalinists": "When will you meet us half way, and how? So far, minority-faction statements have not met us even half way."

But it would be unreasonable to claim that nothing has happened.

Practically speaking, the most important documents have been unanimously approved. The decisions were clear and properly formulated, so that they would not lead to disputes, as has been the case up to now. Contrary to the fact that all through the 1970's the party split was not officially confirmed and that the documents that have been approved are aimed at specific measures to eliminate it. Particularly the young people have demonstrated a sincere desire to render the party split unnecessary.

The SKP now lies waiting for a change and its leaders are doing their jobs under the threat of a special congress. Everything depends on the sort of determination with which the decisions are carried out and interpreted, or, as Olavi Hanninen said at a press conference:

"The difficulties will begin on our first working day."

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CSO: 3107/103



## CP CHAIRMAN SAARINEN PLEDGES TO STEP DOWN IN 2 YEARS

Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT in Finnish 31 May 81 p 24

[Article by Anneli Sundberg]

[Text] For years the chairman of the Finnish Communist Party (SKP) has talked to the party about unified leadership. He plans to leave his post in 2 years time and propose chief secretary Arvo Aalto as his successor.

Two years from now someone will inherit an office in Parliament whose walls have absorbed the smoke of countless North State "greens" and the smell of Aarne Saarinen's pipe tobacco.

Saarinen is to leave Parliament in 1983. He plans to give up the SKP chairman's seat at the same time.

He has a successor in mind, chief secretary Arvo Aalto. Saarinen's plans are quite personal. After last weekend no SKP leader would be so bold as to be sure of his own position and prestige, not even Saarinen.

His own supporters staged a revolt at the 19th SKP Congress and shook the party leadership, the Political Bureau and the party minority's self-confidence to its foundations.

Saarinen had seen the popular revolt coming but its strength surprised him. Saarinen is still a little flabbergasted at the mistrust that has erupted like an earthquake.

For years he has talked about how the party must have leaders capable of cooperating with one another. A couple of years ago, at a national Communist congress, he announced that the party had better start looking for an alternative to himself. Nothing happened. "I didn't even hear rumors that my proposal had been taken seriously."

In good faith Saarinen again agreed to run as candidate for the chairmanship and announced the fact publicly. Then the grumbling began in the north: He has elected himself again. Then when the masses got going and demanded the kind of leadership capable of cooperation Saarinen had hoped for, to his surprise Saarinen noticed that his name was at the top of the list of those to be swept out of office alongside that of vice chairman Taisto Sinisalo.

At Culture House in Helsinki, where the party congress was being held, 67-year-old Saarinen swallowed a tranquillizer and, in private conversations with the rebel congress delegates, tried to explain why it would be hard for him to withdraw from the race so late in the game. "The fact that I didn't for a moment believe that Sinisalo would of his own volition abandon the race influenced my position."

Saarinen also reminded his interlocutors of the 1969 party congress which the minority faction marched out of because of quarrels over candidates.

#### Agonizing Time

While the party congress weekend was a strenuous one for Saarinen and Sinisalo, the congress was at least as agonizing a time for Arvo Aalto and Seppo Toiviainen.

The "reformist" insurrection movement got ready to abandon its flagship, Saarinen, and vigorously pressed Aalto to run as candidate for the chairmanship. The most zealous of them applied downright blackmail. They tried to threaten Aalto with the loss of his chief secretaryship if he did not comply and run against Saarinen.

The same forces that were pressing Aalto applied themselves to Toiviainen. The "reformists," not his own camp, proposed him as a candidate for the vice chairmanship to replace Sinisalo. The fact that there has been an opposition candidate for party leadership seats like Toiviainen is hardly commendable in terms of minority-faction internal power struggles.

Saarinen brands as inflexible tactics his own rebels' attempts to split the minority faction with the aid of Toiviainen.

In Saarinen's opinion, it is important to have someone who has the confidence of the minority and at the same time strives for unity at the head of the party.

So far at least, Sinisalo has the confidence of his own supporters and Saarinen has noticed in him a desire to improve the party's internal situation too.

#### Aalto and Moscow

Saarinen had hoped for unanimous choices at the party congress and, in the end, he got them, although it was a tough job. "I do not believe that the consequences would have been very dramatic if I had withdrawn from the party leadership. Good alternatives were available; I mean Aalto. In my opinion, he is the most suitable of the lot to become the new SKP chairman."

There has been doubt as to Aalto's relations with Moscow since he proposed a historical compromise between the Communists and the national bourgeoisie; nor did the Soviet press like that proposal.

On behalf of Aalto, Saarinen asserted: "At the party congress I said I was convinced that Aalto's relations with the Soviet Communist Party (NKP) are such that his choice as chairman of the SKP could not be questioned."

For a man who is sitting on a powder keg, Saarinen gives an impression of calm, even geniality. A few days have gone by since the tumultuous party congress that rocked Saarinen's position. Saarinen has had time to think about his future.

#### Saarinen and the Party

He hopes not to have to go through another party congress like the 19th, one in which personal quarrels were precipitously aired. If it is up to Saarinen, the party chairman will be replaced before the next party congress, which will be in 1984.

"I have already announced to the Helsinki district that I will not run as a candidate in the 1983 parliamentary elections. My personal intention is to give up my duties as SKP chairman at the same time. I hope that the chairmanship issue can be resolved by that time."

While Saarinen's favorite is Aalto, he also feels that Olavi Hanninen, the Communist head of the Finnish Trade Union Confederation, who was left out of the party speakers' conference at the party congress, is a perfectly suitable candidate.

Saarinen waves aside as unfounded the claims that he or some other party leader ordered Hanninen to withdraw, to make room for new candidates. With a quiet smile, Saarinen discounts the interpretation that Hanninen left the stage as if he were to join the Bank of Finland to groom himself for the chairmanship.

Regardless of who he may be, Saarinen is making an effort to smooth the way for his successor so that the SKP's new chairman will not have to start out as he did in 1966, branded a revisionist and up against a big, hostile opposition.

#### Finnish Communists and the NKP

Saarinen is convinced that Moscow will not try to block the nominations of SKP candidates. "I underline the fact that the SKP is a very independent party. The positions adopted by our brother parties are of no decisive significance to the SKP. When the SKP and the NKP meet, it is a meeting between two independent parties. On the other hand, we should not assume a supercilious attitude toward the good relations we enjoy with the NKP either."

According to Saarinen, during the worst years of strife the party's minority faction did its best to obtain agreements binding on both sides in Moscow. "I always rejected them and demanded that the agreements be concluded in Helsinki."

Shortly before the party congress, Saarinen and several other SKP delegates went to Moscow and afterwards the trip revived old fears among "reformists" who had raised the red flag of rebellion that confining agreements had again been made over their heads.

"I got the impression that the delegation's trip gave rise to deep suspicions in the party majority. The trip was made so close to the party congress because no other mutually agreeable time could be found and no agreements of any kind were made in Moscow either. These suspicions were groundless and false."

Rightly or wrongly, the Moscow trip apparently did reduce Saarinen's rating since, fed up with all sorts of domestic and foreign guardianship, the comrades tried to replace Saarinen with Aalto.

### Feelings

Now that the worst of the dust has settled after the party congress, Saarinen thinks that Aalto's feelings during the congress were more or less the same as his in 1966 when Stalinist rule in the party was ended.

At that time Aimo Aaltonen was still chairman of the SKP. Saarinen was a member of the Political Bureau and the latter had unanimously decided that Erkki Tuominen would be made the party's new chairman.

However, the Politburo did not know that its time had come in the party. A party congress majority refused outright to accept Tuominen. The Politburo stuck to its guns. During the final hours of the congress, Saarinen, who was bound by the Politburo decision, finally gave in under heavy pressure and agreed to run as candidate for the chairmanship. He was elected, but Aaltonen and his supporters at once came to the conclusion that the revisionists had taken over the party.

The accusation had fatal consequences. The party split and has not yet been able to unite.

Many years went into the hustle and bustle of building up the conflict since positions had to be strengthened on both sides. To be sure, they talked about integration and party harmony the whole time, but in fact party comrades who had joined different camps stopped greeting one another on the street.

The party minority took over eight districts, founded its own organ, paid its own officials, put its children into their own children's organization, practiced temperance in its own union and chose its own parliamentary representatives. The majority faction entrenched itself in a similar manner.

It was not until the past couple of years that both camps became seriously concerned that the party was rotting away under their feet and losing its support because of the dispute.

In Saarinen's opinion, hopes have been aroused that members are getting closer to one another in the party cells and at work, that artists and scientists have been able to overcome isolation within the party.

In Saarinen's opinion, the party congress also for the first time revealed a real desire for unity.

Party machines, however, remain unchanged. Many a bureaucrat's or parliamentary representative's position depends on whether the party split is preserved. Saarinen is well aware of that. And he smiles: "Unity does not depend on me or Sinisalo, rather on the forces behind each of us. They have controlled our behavior. We have been the prisoners in this affair, I as well as Sinisalo."

## INDEPENDENCE PARTY GAINING GROUND

Reykjavik NEWS FROM ICELAND in English Jun 81 p 16

[Text] A mid-May poll taken by *Dagbladið*, a Reykjavik daily noted for its accurate election-day forecasts in recent years, found that popular support of the Independence Party (now overwhelmingly in the parliamentary opposition) had grown somewhat since last January.

Simple mathematics indicated that the IP, Iceland's strongest party for many decades, would gain 6 additional seats in the 60-member Althing (parliament) from a hypothetical national election — and that the People's Alliance stood to garner a single extra seat.

But as the question that was posed sidestepped the

disarray in IP parliamentary ranks, interpretation of the survey data was admittedly difficult. The present governing coalition is headed by IP deputy chairman Gunnar Thoroddsen, while only a tiny handful of IP legislators back it. On the other hand, the cabinet is supported by the Progressives and the People's Alliance. Like most IP members of Althing, the Social Democrats are in the opposition.

With the split in its ranks not taken into account, the Independence Party now holds 22 seats, the Progressives 17, the People's Alliance 11 and the Social Democrats 10. There is speculation that

the IP national congress, scheduled for next October, will become the scene of bitter infighting.

The *Dagbladið* poll involved a sample of 600, as usual. Of those canvassed, 38.4% were undecided, favoured no party or refused to answer the question.

Interestingly, another opinion survey conducted by the newspaper last month showed that Thoroddsen's government, which has a slender parliamentary majority, still enjoyed an ample popular backing: 52.3% — compared with an astounding 61.5% last January, and with 41.2% in September.



## POLL: IMPETUS FOR LABOR FROM BRUNDTLAND SEEN EBBING

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 May 81 p 3

[Article by Eivind G. Karlsen]

[Text] The Labor Party is "in a resting position" for the first time since Gro Harlem Brundtland took over as prime minister. Does this then mean that the impetus for the party from Brundtland is no longer there. Of course, that cannot be taken for granted, the government party has still got theoretical possibilities of winning the Storting election in September. But the struggle for the government power is becoming more acute. The three biggest non-socialist parties have united their forces in progress, despite a minor setback for the Conservative Party. A strong and clear demonstration of willingness on the part of the non-socialist parties to enter into a binding cooperation with a view to taking over the government may cause them to take the offensive in a decisive manner.

The political barometer of the Norwegian Market Data, Inc., for April-May shows only small changes from March, apart from the fact that the Christian People's Party has advanced by 1.1 percentage points to 11.1. That is important because the party has got many vulnerable mandates. However, it is at least equally important that the support of the Conservative Party seems to have steadied at somewhat more than 30 percent, 5-6 percent more than the party obtained in the Storting election in 1977. The Conservative Party will, to all appearances, return to the Storting in the fall with a clearly larger group than the present group of 41 representatives.

However, no victory may be taken for granted, great efforts are needed. This applies also to the Conservative Party and to the Christian People's Party and the Center Party with whom it would like to cooperate. According to the poll taken by the Norwegian Market Data, Inc., these three parties have now mustered 49.3 percent of the vote, nearly 1 percent more than in March. By way of comparison, the Labor Party and the Socialist-Left Party have a total support of 42 percent, 0.4 percent less than last time.

The Socialist-Left Party is in a somewhat better position than according to its results in the 1977 election. The decisive weakening of the present majority parties, therefore, occurs within the Labor Party. In 1977, the government party actually had a larger support on its own, viz. 42.3 percent, than it now has together with the Socialist-Left Party.

Although the trend of the polls for the Labor Party from March to April-May, in no way, is considered alarming, danger signals are, undoubtedly, perceived. The apparatus of the party must now be trimmed and the interests of representatives kindled to ensure a sufficiently good election in September.

Prime Minister and party chairman Gro Harlem Brundtland and her colleagues are, no doubt, also ready to use their positions and possibilities of making moves when, in a couple of weeks, the Storting goes into recess. However, the Labor Party cannot afford making any political blunders.

That applies, of course, also to the non-socialists who thus will have to be on their guard against new initiatives on the part of the Labor Party but who, above all, must make clear and define the alternative which they themselves stand for. There is no doubt as to what their voters want.

The deputy chairman of the Labor Party, Cabinet Minister Einar Førde, states in a commentary to AFTENPOSTEN: "We still have a reasonable chance of winning the election. And even if the necessary lacking support (from 37.3 percent) viz. Between 41 and 43 percent, may be hard to win, it is within our reach."

"Incidentally, there are indications that the Labor Party is definitely again the biggest party. That means a lot to us," the deputy chairman of the Norwegian Labor Party, Einar Førde states.

The chairman of the Conservative Party, Jo Benkow, M.P., says that, as far as his party is concerned, he is satisfied with the figures of the poll taken by the Norwegian Market Data, Inc. "One should be careful not to take an isolated view of the results of a poll. But to the extent that this poll gives a picture there is a strengthening of the 3-party group."

We now start getting so many signals indicating that the progress of the Labor Party is leveling out that we can attach a certain amount of significance to this, says Jo Benkow. The chairman of the Conservative Party is especially happy about the progress which the three biggest non-socialist parties have been able to make in total.

[Question] Another poll today confirms the demand among voters for a new statement of cooperation from the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party?

[Answer] I first want to give expression to my personal gratification that a clear majority among those polled desires a binding cooperation among us. And, as far as I myself am concerned, I would like to contribute to the efforts for some kind of statement prior to the election which may satisfy all those who go in for this cooperation, the chairman of the Conservative Party says.

## POLL SHOWS MOST PREFER MULTI PARTY, NONSOCIALIST CABINET

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 May 81 p 3

[Text] According to this week's poll taken by Norwegian Market Data, Inc., there are nearly twice as many supporters as opponents of a binding cooperation among the three largest non-socialist parties. A total of 57 percent supports such a cooperation, 30 percent is against it, 51 percent is of the opinion that the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party should produce a new declaration of cooperation prior to the election.

The poll taken during the period from 16 March to 10 April shows that 31 percent finds such a declaration unnecessary. The majority of the population is of the opinion that the three parties should agree on a candidate for the post of prime minister prior to the election if they cooperate on a government alternative. A total of 56 percent of those asked shares this opinion while 37 percent is of the opinion that the question of prime minister should be settled after the election.

The poll was taken in the form of personal interviews on a national basis of approximately 1,300 women and men above the age of 18.

Question No 1: "Prior to the last Storting election, the three biggest non-socialist parties, the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party, and the Center Party, cooperated to constitute a government alternative. Do you support or oppose a continued binding cooperation among these three parties?"

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	Total Number Asked	Political Affiliation:					
		Labor Party	Socialist Left Party	Conserv- ative Party	Christian People's Party	Center Party	Liberal Party
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Support	57	41	19	77	87	79	50
Oppose	30	43	60	20	6	15	40
No opinion	13	16	21	3	7	6	10
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

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In the table, we have shown the percentage distribution of answers for everybody asked, and we have grouped the answers according to political affiliation. Among those who want to vote for one of the three biggest non-socialist parties, there is, as we see, a very clear majority that wants cooperation, altogether approximately four-fifths of these voters. In a corresponding poll taken in March of 1979, thus 2 years earlier, a somewhat smaller majority wanted cooperation among the three parties. At the time, we found that 48 percent supported a binding cooperation, 36 percent opposed it, while 16 percent was in doubt.

Question No 2: "In your opinion, should these three parties make a new joint declaration of cooperation prior to the election or do you find this unnecessary?"

	Total Number Asked	Political Affiliation:					
		Labor Party	Socialist Left Party	Conserv- ative Party	Christian People's Party	Center Party	Liberal Party
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Should	51	45	42	59	68	59	54
Unnecessary	31	31	49	34	21	25	28
In doubt	18	24	9	8	11	16	18
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Question No 3: "If the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party cooperate on a government alternative prior to the next Storting election, do you then feel that the parties should agree on a candidate for the post of prime minister prior to the election or do you find that this question should not be settled until after the election?"

	Total Number Asked	Political Affiliation:					
		Labor Party	Socialist Left Party	Conserv- ative Party	Christian People's Party	Center Party	Liberal Party
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Before election	56	61	62	55	46	49	65
After election	37	32	30	41	46	46	28
In doubt	7	7	8	4	7	6	7
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Among the total number of voters who vote for one of the three largest non-socialist parties, a relatively modest majority is of the opinion that the choice of prime minister candidate should be agreed upon prior to the election. Among those who vote for the Labor Party, the Socialist-Left Party or the Liberal Party, there is actually a much larger percentage that wants this.

#### GALLUP'S POLITICAL BAROMETER

	Storting Election Sep 1977	County Elections Sep 1979	1980 Jan	1980 Jun	1981 Mar	1981 Apr/ May
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Radical Liberal Party	0.6	0.8	0.8	0.3	0.7	0.7
Labor Party	42.3	36.2	37.8	38.0	37.4	37.2
Communist Party	0.4	-	0.5	0.1	0.4	0.2
Socialist-Left Party	4.2	4.4	4.6	3.9	5.0	4.8
	47.5	41.4	43.7	42.3	43.5	42.9
Progressive Party	1.9	2.5	3.5	3.9	2.2	2.8
Liberal People's Party	1.4	1.2	1.2	1.1	0.9	0.8
Conservative Party	24.8	29.7	28.2	28.4	31.4	31.0
Christian People's Party	12.4	10.1	10.8	11.4	10.0	11.1
Center Party	8.6	8.6	6.7	7.7	7.0	7.2
Liberal Party	3.2	5.3	5.3	5.0	4.4	3.8
Others	0.2	0.6	0.6	0.2	0.6	0.4
Total	100.1	99.4	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Answer to party preference			1270	1145	1048	1066
Total number interviewed			1587	1386	1251	1310



The parameter appears from a comparison of each party with the Storting election in 1977. Calculated statistical limits of error may be of the magnitude of 3 percent for voter shares close to 50 percent, approximately 2 percent for voter shares of 10-20 percent and close to 1 percent for lower voter shares.

The poll was taken during the period 25 April - 20 May 1981.

Oslo, 29 May 1981

Norwegian Market Data, Inc.

7/6.

CSO: 3108/148

## NONSOCIALIST PARTIES WORK TO AGREE ON LONG-RANGE PLAN

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 30 May 81 p 3

[Article by Terje Svabø]

[Text] The Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party are now fully prepared to make a joint report on the long-term program of the government. All three parties are now working to make joint comments in as many areas as possible. The idea that each of the three parties had to make its own report has now been completely abandoned. The cooperation among the three parties on the long-range plan, to a very great extent, contributes to the pressure they put on themselves to form a majority government after the election. In spite of this, there will be special comments, among other things, on the abortion issue and the oil policy.

The three cooperation parties started their work on their long-range plan already in January with informal discussions. There have been frequent meetings during the last few weeks, and this weekend will be needed to complete the work. The finance committee expects to make its report next Tuesday or Wednesday.

Also in 1977, the cooperation parties made a joint report. It was, however, of a somewhat different nature than the one on which the three parties are cooperating this year. To a far greater extent than in 1977, the Storting election programs of the three parties form the basis of this year's joint report. The report will be more in the nature of a program than was the case in 1977 when much of the report was based on quotations and excerpts from the Storting negotiations.

The model for the program now chosen will be very binding upon the parties in their work in the Storting during the coming period.

It is primarily Rolf Presthus (Conservative Party), Kjell Magne Bondevik (Christian People's Party), and Sverre Helland (Center Party) who have been directing the work on the joint report seeing that they are the chief spokesmen of the parties in the finance committee.

The cooperation parties state themselves that they will present a reply to the government program, showing that the non-socialist parties most certainly have an alternative program. They, moreover, point out that the negotiations in the Storting especially this spring have demonstrated their ability to stand together.

Nevertheless, it is clear that they cannot agree on everything, which, of course, is natural as long as it is a question of three independent parties. The abortion issue has created the biggest problems. There is reason to believe that each of the three parties will here make its own report. It will be interesting to see when the matter comes up in the Storting whether the Christian People's Party will be prepared to support a secondary alternative to the party's own restrictive proposal.

There is also dispute in respect of the oil policy, not least with regard to the choice of the future rate of production.

To AFTENPOSTEN it is being described as juggling with figures that one has to bind oneself to a future annual production of 50, 70 or 90 million tons of oil/gas.

It is pointed out that the most essential thing must be to reach an agreement on how to use the revenues domestically. The main purpose is to secure a regular production as well as to maintain the employment level.

The three parties agree that the struggle against the growing inflation must be the main task during the coming years. They here agree on measures to increase the rate of growth of industry and to secure the competitiveness abroad.

One of the reasons why the work on the joint report is now proceeding so well is that the Christian People's Party and the Center Party see a clear willingness on the part of the Conservative Party to accommodate what the two parties characterize as the center policy.

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## PAPER COMMENTS ON POLL SHOWING GAINS FOR NONSOCIALISTS

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 1 Jun 81 p 3

[Editorial]

[Text] We are being constantly warned against attaching too much importance to Gallup polls and political opinion polls. The polls may change rapidly, they say. Moreover, an opinion poll is no election. Nevertheless, quite a few people are probably at present absorbed in the study of the placement of the various parties according to the public opinion tables. The questions whether Brundtland is still giving an impetus to the Labor Party, and how much strength there is in the wave of popularity of the Conservative Party apparently have been, and still are, the most interesting issues and points. And things seem to be going quite well for both parties. The Labor Party is still in a good position, but the said impetus for the Labor Party has not increased to the extent that the party had hoped for and, no doubt, had reckoned with. The new, the exciting and the dynamic force which the country's woman prime minister is said to represent gave the Labor Party a good deal of extra support after the changes within the government, but it now looks as if the excitement has subsided somewhat. People are probably in the process of discovering that these new and attractive faces stand for exactly the same policy as the "old" government. It is being confirmed once more that it is not new people that the Labor Party primarily needs but a new policy.

The Conservative Party has reason to be happy about its secure position, with a support of more than 30 percent among the voters according to the polls, and both the Christian People's Party and the Center Party have recorded pleasant advances. The latest figures published show a strong majority for these three parties. And this leads to a third question which is no less interesting and important than the question of the support of the Labor Party and the Conservative Party: Can we expect a binding cooperation among the three parties? Can we be certain of getting a 3-party government if these parties secure for themselves the majority in the election in the fall?

According to this week's Gallup poll, the vast majority of the voters of the Conservative Party, the Christian People's Party and the Center Party wants such a binding cooperation. As is well-known, it has often been written and said that it is primarily the Conservatives who advocate the idea of cooperation. The figures now available show that there is a clear

majority within the two other parties both for a concrete cooperation and--no doubt, to the surprise of many people--for the idea of the three parties making a joint statement prior to the election. In other words, things seem to be going quite well for the non-socialist parties. There are signs of greater efforts for the non-socialist joint alternative, for a clearer position, for a departure from the somewhat reluctant and somewhat irresolute attitude, toward a positive attitude and toward aggressive action. It is possible that the impetus given to the Labor Party by Brundtland has been ebbing, but, as is well-known, a public opinion poll is no election, and a great many things may happen prior to the election on 14 September.

In order for the election to be won and for the necessary changes of course in Norwegian politics to take place, the leaders of the three coalition parties will have to make it crystal clear that they represent a united and realistic alternative to the policy of the socialists. The public opinion figures show that this is what the voters want. There should, therefore, be no reason to hesitate.

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## POOR MINISTRY COORDINATION ALLOWED SOVIET OIL SEARCH

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 26 May 81 p 48

[Article by Morten Fyhn]

[Text] The Soviet Union undertook seismic tests for years in the disputed area in the Barents Sea until Norway complained last fall. After the matter was taken up by Norway, the tests stopped. The reason why the Russians were able to carry out such tests for such a long time without any official Norwegian reaction--as far as AFTENPOSTEN has learned--was poor co-ordination between the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Only when the political leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs realized what was going on in the Barents Sea was the matter taken up with the Russians. This did not happen in the form of a protest. What Norway wanted to point out to the Russians was that, as long as both states lay claims to the same area in the Barents Sea, both states must have the same rights. The Norwegians pointed out what happened in 1976 when the Norwegian ship, the Longva, undertook seismic tests in the same area. At the time, the Russians complained orally to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stating that the area in question was to be considered Soviet territory. The Longva carried out its tests east of the sector boundary which the Russians consider the dividing line in the Barents Sea. However, the Longva was never east of the center line, which Norway, in principle considers the dividing line.

During the last few years, Norway's fundamental view has been that both parties must show reserve in the area, and that nobody has a claim to any special rights. But what the Russians would not allow Norway to do, they have themselves been doing for several years. As far as AFTENPOSTEN has learned, the political leadership of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not realize this. The results of observations in the possession of the Ministry of Defense were not passed on to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for its evaluation. This must have surprised the Russians. As far as AFTENPOSTEN understands, the opinion held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is that the matter was handled in a somewhat unfortunate manner. That is why they reacted immediately when they realized that the Russians were carrying out seismic tests. There has been no reply from the Russians, but the seismic tests ceased. At the same time, the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs and the Ministry of Defense have taken steps to improve the contact between the two ministries in order to avoid anything similar from happening in the future.

If the Russians start their tests anew, Norway will probably consider whether Norway should undertake such tests as well.

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## BRIEFS

**LIBERAL CHAIRMAN'S SEAT VULNERABLE**--According to a poll taken by the Norwegian Institute of Public Opinion for **SUNNMORSPOSTEN**, the Conservative Party is now clearly the largest party in More and Romsdal, and, with its 52 percent support, it is about to secure 3 out of the 10 mandates from the county. However, the most surprising aspect is that the Liberal Party is in such a weak position in More and Romsdal that the mandate of party chairman Hans Hammond Rossbach has become vulnerable. Few people had probably expected the mandate of the chairman of the Liberal Party to be in the danger zone in what has been considered one of the strongest bastions of the Liberal Party. However, in the public opinion poll, the Liberal Party obtained merely 7 percent, and, with a 0.5 percent drop during the period up to the Storting elections, Rossbach's seat in the Storting would become most vulnerable. Today, first and foremost, the Conservative Party is showing gains. [Text] [Oslo **AFTENPOSTEN** in Norwegian 1 Jun 81 p 3] 7262

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## TWO PARTIES IN GOVERNMENT VIEWED AS HAVING SERIOUS WEAKNESSES

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 30 May 81 p 2

[Editorial: "The Middle in a Crisis"]

[Text] The two parties which will govern Sweden alone until autumn 1982 are obviously grappling with large problems. Large numbers of voters in the middle have deserted their parties. And significant numbers of voters seem to be in the process of leaving. The question of whether there really is a "bottom" can, at least for the Liberal Party, no longer be considered unwarranted.

The problems of the parties in the middle are partly parallel, but to a large extent they have entirely different causes.

The dissatisfaction with the Center Party is caused primarily by the fact that in its government role the party could not live up to its own goals--for the simple reason that these were not realistic.

It is sufficient to point to the hollowness of the decentralization philosophy. For many years the center has given the voters the impression that Swedish society should be exposed to a revolutionary decentralization process. The voters have certainly not seen much of this revolution.

An even more difficult commitment was made by the Center Party in the nuclear power question. Nuclear power should be liquidated, period. But the expansion of nuclear power continues, as is known, with the Center Party at the helm.

The government has disclosed the fragility in the Center Party's ideology. The program of the center did not hold together when confronted with reality.

Political reality furthermore demands an economic policy of the kind that the center has always called "rightwing." This reinforces the party's credibility problem.

It has often been claimed by the Center Party that the party's difficulties were due to their having the prime minister post, and therefore their position was especially exposed.

There is some truth in that assertion. Prime Minister and Center Party leader Thorbjørn Fälldin has not had the ability to depict himself as a national leader, and appears--justly or unjustly--for more and more voters as a powerless head of government. At the same time his loyalty to the two governments he has led has caused him to tone down his role as party leader. Fälldin's position within the Center Party can now for the first time be seen as seriously weakened.

In comparison with the conservatives the liberals are, in the eyes of many, tottering and untrustworthy. The Liberal Party leadership's constant leaning toward the Left, and talk that block politics must be broken up, are not consistent with the majority of bourgeois voters' wishes.

The way in which the Liberal Party meets the advances of the Conservative Party is not impressive either. One of the Liberal Party's dilemmas is that they have deluded themselves into believing that the conservatives stand for reactionary policies. They harbor an instinctive distaste of everything which is conservative, while at the same time all the more voters see the conservative policies as the only correct ones.

If this strategy has attracted radical voters, it could in a tactical sense have been considered as not entirely unsuccessful. But that is not the case. The liberals are not an attractive alternative for voters on the Left. Among youthful voters the party is easily entirely dismissed.

Liberal Party leader Ola Ullsten himself personifies to a large extent the policy which is taking his party to the brink of the abyss. It is really shocking that Ullsten and the group around him are not afraid to set a course which can actually end in catastrophe.

The prognoses of both the government parties for the next year are gloomy. Their hope is now that their position in the government will prove to be an asset in spite of everything.

A government always stands in the middle of its policies, and can always expect publicity; the theory is correct this far.

But a decisive question is naturally which policy the government is going to carry out. If it is to be an unsteady, thumb-on-the-scales policy, with an input of opportunism and bustling for a scarcely interested social democracy, the middle parties have little hope of a future.

If both parties decide to carry out the three-party government's policy and incline toward the bourgeois majority in the Riksdag, the picture can possibly brighten somewhat. What the voters now want more than anything is */consistency/* [in italics] in economic policies. Perhaps it will be easier for the middle parties to accept this fact when the conservatives are out of the government and the middle parties bear the entire responsibility for developments.



## NO CHANGE EXPECTED IN TURKISH-FRENCH RELATIONS

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 12 May 81 pp 1, 7

[Analysis of Turkish reactions to the French presidential election]

[Text] Ankara, 12 May--CUMHURIYET--As Head of State General Kenan Evren sent a congratulatory message to Mitterrand, congratulating him on his election to the presidency, political circles in the capital expressed "the hope" that Mitterrand's election would not affect Turkish-French relations. In expressing this wish, political circles proceed from the following line of analysis: "Relations between Turkey and France are deeply rooted, and these relations are on a state-to-state level. It is to be expected that relations on a state-to-state level will not be affected by a change brought about by an election. The place of France in Europe and her interests are clear. Within this framework it is to be hoped that relations between Turkey and France will continue and develop in the same way as before and that Mitterrand will not act in a different fashion."

The same circles state that a period of time must elapse before the foreign policy France will pursue under the leadership of Mitterrand takes shape, and they add that, "at the same time, no change worth mentioning is expected in France's policy. France's position in Europe, her place within the Common Market, and her policies on NATO are all clear. It is expected that there will be no fundamental changes in these. There is no doubt in Europe regarding this. It is understood that the real changes will be in the economic policies to be followed."

In discussions held in Ankara following Mitterrand's election, the first topic was the attitude he's likely to take in the matter of the Armenians. Some time before the elections, Mitterrand promised voters of Armenian descent that he would place the "Armenian genocide" on the record at the United Nations. Mitterrand sent a message to the demonstration held by Armenians in Lyon on 24 April, expressing his solidarity. When we reminded an official of the foreign ministry of these views of Mitterrand's, he said, "Politicians can give out such statements while in the opposition and at election time. However, when the same individuals assume positions of responsibility, they do what is required by their responsibilities. We hope that Mitterrand, too, will act in the responsible manner required by his office during his term as president."

## He Has No Intimate Knowledge of Turkey

Some informed circles, on the other hand, state that Mitterrand has no intimate knowledge of Turkey, and that his knowledge of Turkey's problems is "second hand." One observer stated his views to CUMHURIYET along these lines, "I don't believe that he has an in-depth knowledge of Turkey's problems. Until now, his area of interest has been more in the direction of Africa and the Middle East."

One of the important factors in Turkish-French relations, which, except for a period of rapprochement during De Gaulle's presidency, have followed a generally cold and distant course over the last few years, has been the traditional closeness between Paris and Athens. It is not expected that there will be any significant change in this. The removal from office of Giscard, who had a close personal relationship with Karamanlis, has eliminated an emotional factor from Turkish-French relations. The fact that Mitterrand plans to nationalize major companies, among them the famous arms manufacturing firm d'Assault, may concern Greek circles, who have had close ties with them. However Greece may be able to fill this gap by using another channel, such as the influence exerted by PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement Party] on Mitterrand.

## Relations Between Mitterrand and the RPP

At this point, one is also reminded of the close links between the French Socialist Party and the RPP within the Socialist International. Mitterrand is also a close friend of former RPP General Chairman Bulent Ecevit. According to some observers, an opportunity for improving Turkish-French relations in the upcoming period rests on relations between Turkish social democrats and Mitterrand.

With regard to the problems of Turkish workers in France, it is expected that Mitterrand will follow a more liberal policy towards guest workers in comparison with that of Giscard. It is stated that this will have a reassuring effect from the viewpoint of Turkish workers. Last year in Paris Mitterrand visited Turkish workers holding a hunger strike to protest restrictions imposed on the social rights of foreign workers, and he let them know that he supported them.

Ecevit: "This May Be the Beginning of a Hopeful Period for Humanity"

Former RPP General Chairman Bulent Ecevit gave a statement on the election of Mitterrand as president of France. Ecevit said that, provided the French Socialist Party's victory is repeated in the parliamentary elections, "this may be the start of a hopeful period for humanity on the way of strengthening democracy and freedom in a just system, and of finding a sound way out of economic and social crises."

Bulent Ecevit characterized Mitterrand's victory in the election as "an event of importance not only for his country, but also for all of Europe and even the world."

Bulent Ecevit added his hope that Mitterrand's presidency would contribute to a revitalization of Turkish-French relations.

When he was asked to give an evaluation of the election from Turkey's point of view, Caglayanil answered: "Turkish-French relations never played a part in the election campaign during the French elections. However, since the position of the president who was defeated is well known, there is no need for any concern on Turkey's part."

Former foreign ministers Hayrettin Erkmen and Turhan Feyzioglu also stated that no change is to be expected in France's foreign policy.

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CSO: 4907/274

## TURKEY REMAINS IN EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 15 May 81 P 6

[Report by M. Ali Bircand on decisions regarding Turkey's membership by the Assembly of the Council of Europe's 14 May meeting in Strasbourg]

[Text] Strasbourg, 15 May--MILLIYET--The Assembly of the Council of Europe decided yesterday that Turkey would be granted a period of grace, under some conditions, until January 1982, but that the term of office of the Turkish parliamentary group would not be extended.

This proposal, which suggests that Turkey be granted a new grace period and can be characterized as "extremely lenient," received 61 votes in favor, 15 votes against, and 40 members registering abstentions.

The proposal rejecting the extension of the terms of office of the Turkish parliamentarians was passed with 51 votes in favor, 48 against, and 8 abstentions. This decision, which came about as a result of a "compromise" arrived at behind the scenes by the British conservative parliamentary group and some socialist representatives from the Scandinavian countries, was received with satisfaction by Turkish Foreign Minister Turkmen, who said that, "the decision of the Council of Europe not to extend the terms of office of the Turkish parliamentarians is in line with the Turkish position."

The outcome, characterized by part of the communist and socialist group as "shameful," emerged from four days of hitherto unprecedented bargaining for votes.

## The Meeting

When the session was opened at 1600 Turkish time yesterday afternoon, voting began on the proposal prepared by President Steiner, who stated that 50 people had spoken giving views in favor and in opposition, as well as on 40 amendments designed to make its terms harsher.

After the proponent of each amendment had risen to explain the reasons for it, Steiner took the floor and said that, "if these amendments are accepted and my proposal is changed, there may not be a majority during the final voting." By this he indicated that he wanted no part of any change in his proposal and that those who thought like him should follow the same course.

As one after another of the proposed amendments was rejected, the one that attracted the most notice was the proposal offered by the Belgian socialist Dejardin, who asked that "reference be made to the two previous decisions adopted by the Council of Europe regarding Turkey." When this, too, was voted down, Dejardin took the floor and declared: "I have never witnessed such a thing. Are the members of the Council perhaps ashamed of their previous decisions that they proceed in such a manner? Or else has there been any change in the situation in Turkey that would cause them to reject such an entirely normal motion? In that case, why did you enact the previous decisions?"

Among the proposed amendments, the only one that was adopted was a proposal by Mommersteeg (Holland), asking that prisoners not be mistreated and calling for a definite end to the application of torture.

Following the balloting on the amendments, those who took part in the meeting, which passed amidst heated debate and occasional sharp exchanges, were invited to vote on the whole of Steiner's proposal. Upon a motion from the floor, supported by ten members, the vote was conducted on a roll-call basis.

The result was 61 votes in favor, 15 against, and 40 abstentions on the proposal, which Steiner presented as a personal motion because of disagreements within the political commission.

A point that attracted attention was the fact that motions calling for "a recommendation to the Committee of Ministers to cancel Turkey's council membership," that were proposed by communists and some socialists during the debate in the political commission and were voted down, did not come up in the general session.

Another interesting point is that for the first time 116 members out of a total parliamentary membership of 158 participated in a vote. In voting previous to this the average number of council members voting has not exceeded 80.

#### What Is Contained in the Decision

The final paragraph of the decision, considered the most important, states the following: "The Council of Europe declares its intention to examine the issue again in the second session (September) of its 33d term, and it reserves the right to forward a new recommendation to the Council of Ministers in its third session, to be held in January 1982, in the light of the state of constitutional and other projects at that time."

According to Steiner, who prepared the proposal, the clear meaning of this is that the matter of Turkey will be taken up in coming sessions, and that the definite decision on Turkey's membership will be taken during the session to be held in January 1982. Steiner issued the following statement: "In this way we can say that Turkey has been given a conditional grace period. In January 1982 the state of affairs and developments regarding the constitution, the law on elections, human rights, basic freedoms, and other matters will be examined and a decision will be taken. However this does not mean that a decision on Turkey will not be taken in September or at the mini-assembly. The council's sensitivity in the



matter of torture, basic freedoms, and the return to democracy is obvious, and if there should be a deterioration in the situation, the council may act immediately."

In an interview with Turkish journalist, the British conservative representative Lord Reay said, "We are entering a period of close scrutiny until 1982. However this does not mean that another decision will not be taken during this interval."

#### The Voting on the Parliamentarians

After this, the council passed on a proposal stating that the term of office of the Turkish parliamentary delegation cannot be extended since to do so would violate the rules of the Council of Europe, a proposal offered jointly by the Danish socialist representative Budtz and the British conservative representative Sir F. Bennett.

Budtz and Bennett, who engaged in bargaining in which the conservatives would be supported in obtaining such a moderate decision in the matter of Turkey, but, in turn, the conservatives would agree to support the decision regarding the Turkish delegation, each gave a speech disclosing this compromise and called for a vote.

The vote was 51 to 48, with 10 members remaining in abstention.

#### The Text of the Decision

##### The Council of Europe:

1. Notes the report of the President of the Council of Europe, following his consultations with the Turkish leadership in Ankara,
2. Aware of the observations of other parliamentary delegations who visited Ankara and Istanbul,
3. Reiterating its concern regarding the matter of a transition to a democratic regime,
4. Hopes that concrete decisions concerning the establishment of democratic institutions in a form agreeing with guarantees given by the Minister of State will be disclosed in the near future,
5. Hopes that as terrorism in Turkey recedes, there will also be an improvement in the areas of human rights, basic freedoms, and the return to democracy,
6. Underlines especially the necessity of the cessation of all torture and mistreatment of prisoners,
7. Entrusts the Political Commission with the responsibility of following developments especially in the field of human rights, basic freedoms, and the return to democracy, and of issuing a report on this to the forthcoming session,
8. Entrusts the Legal Commission, along with the Political Commission, with the responsibility of examining the legal aspects of the present situation,

9. Adopts the decision to examine the issue during the second session of the 33d term, and reserves the right to forward a recommendation to the Committee of Ministers, in the light of developments on a constitution, which is to attain project status at that time, and on other matters.

While the meetings were in progress, a group of about 40 protesters staged a demonstration outside the Council of Europe. Members of the group, who demanded an end to torture and the expulsion of Turkey from the council, covered their faces in order to avoid being recognized.

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CSO: 4907/274

## LAWYERS CALL FOR ASSEMBLY REPRESENTATION

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 17 May 81 pp 1, 7

[Report on Ankara Bar Association President Muammer Aksoy's 16 May speech to the Turkish Bar Associations' Union's congress in Ankara]

[Text] Ankara, 17 May--CUMHURIYET--The General Assembly of the Turkish Bar Associations' Union began its meeting yesterday morning at the Turkish Institute of Standards in Ankara. Two foreign representatives from the International Union of Democratic Jurists were also present as observers at the congress of the Turkish Bar Associations' Union.

At the congress, where Konya Bar Association President Ihsan Onur was elected as chairman, Ankara Bar Association President Muammer Aksoy, acting as host, delivered the opening address. Bar Associations' Union President Attila Sav summarized the report of activities presented to the congress. At the noon hour the chairman and a group of delegates went to Ataturk's mausoleum to observe a moment of respectful silence in the name of the congress.

Ankara Bar Association President Muammer Aksoy stated the following in his opening address: "Even if one can accept and regard as correct the restriction of liberties and the temporary suspension of some immunities and rules of the rule of law, for the sake of assuring security of life, the resort to torture can never be viewed with toleration, even as a means of preventing organized terror."

In touching on the subject of torture Professor Aksoy spoke in this way: "We honestly believe that the present administration wants to oppose torture with all its might. But in real life it is impossible to stop some zealous officials in the lower ranks from employing torture." Aksoy continued his remarks as follows:

"A contemporary understanding of law can never adopt a mode of thinking that is so fanatical and divorced from real life that it would say: 'some rules of law and some institutions are so sacred that, rather than accept their suspension even for a limited period, one must risk accepting the deaths of thousands of people, even the fragmenting of the state and the slide of society into a civil war, and this is as it should be.' The principles of the rule of law are extremely precious. Freedom and democratic institutions are the preconditions for assuring the happiness of modern man. But when security of life has vanished, when terror in every place has made mankind its slave, when the country itself has come face to face

with the danger of civil war, then as long as this state of affairs continues, the observance of freedoms and immunities in the same manner as in ordinary times is not beneficial, and can only bring about injurious and extremely dangerous consequences.

"However, even if one can accept and regard as correct the restriction of liberties and the temporary suspension of some immunities and rules of the rule of law, for the sake of assuring security of life, the resort to torture can never be viewed with toleration, even as a means of preventing organized terror. We jurists can not accept torture, which represents the trampling underfoot of the dignity of man and is the greatest crime against humanity, for any purpose whatsoever."

Aksoy said that the establishment of a judicial constabulary directly connected with judges and prosecutors would be helpful from the point of view of reducing incidents of torture to a minimum. Also touching on the matter of the constituent assembly, Aksoy stated: "If jurists are not represented to a sufficient degree in the constituent assembly that will prepare the constitution, Turkish society will suffer damaging consequences, our new constitution will be seriously impaired in the future, and if the constitution is prepared without knowledge of the experiments extending from past centuries to the present, or if it is prepared as we are turning our backs to them, that constitution will not be democratic and in a short time it will be faced with even greater difficulties than the 1961 constitution"

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## STATUS OF LARZAC MILITARY CAMP EXPANSION

Paris LE MONDE in French 30 May-1 Jun 81 p 8

[Article: "Larzac Military Camp Expansion Project"]

[Text] When asked, on Friday, 29 May, what will be done about the current expansion of the Larzac military camp, Jean Le Garrec, spokesman for [Prime Minister] Pierre Mauroy, replied: "It is up to Charles Hernu [the defense minister] to submit specific recommendations." At the Hotel Matignon [prime minister's office and residence], Robert Lion, the prime minister's staff director, and some of his associates, met in the late afternoon to discuss this problem with Francois Bernard, the defense minister's civil and military staff director who was accompanied by several technical advisers.

Referring to Mauroy's decision to ask each cabinet minister to prepare a list of measures that could be taken without delay, the prime minister's spokesman said renunciation of the statement that this Larzac camp expansion project is in the public interest "was obviously the kind of measure included in those that can be taken immediately."

The minister of defense, who is being urged to submit proposals by the Hotel Matignon, actually seems to be moving rather toward an intermediate compromise solution because of the difficulty of the Larzac situation.

## Leopard's Skin

From a political standpoint, cancellation of the current expansion of this military installation in the department of Aveyron would be highly appreciated by those environmentalists who have been calling for such action for the past 10 years. On the military level, however, there is considerable pressure from the general staffs. Moreover, within the prime minister's own personal staff, it is acknowledged that today the French Army needs sufficient space to train up to one division and conduct maneuvers or firing exercises with three tank companies simultaneously.

The situation is complicated by the fact that the Ministry of Defense has already acquired 10,670 of the 13,500 hectares approved pursuant to a mutual agreement by the parties concerned, in other words, 80 percent of the surface area desired by the army which has owned some 3,000 hectares on the Larzac Plateau since the beginning of this century.



The ownership of some of these parcels of land continues, however, to be disrupted. Some farmers or environmentalists have lodged an appeal with the Supreme Court against the judge's expropriation orders, in view of the fact that there has no longer been a mutual agreement for more than 2 years.

Before the above-mentioned meeting in the Hotel Matignon, the defense minister had received a memorandum from the army general staff, a memorandum described as quite blunt and in which the army expressed its point of view and upheld the necessity of successfully completing the expansion project. Because of local resistance to the project, parcels of land have been acquired in a rather disorderly fashion. As a result, with its parcels of land already purchased or in the process of being purchased, the camp currently looks like "a leopard skin," to quote a senior officer, with its hodgepodge of some areas legally owned by the state and other areas, adjacent to or inside the state-owned lands, which the government has still not been able to acquire.

This mosaic is so confusing that the army general staff has had to revise the camp's firing and maneuver regulations and procedures.

The Armed Forces Office of the Inspector General has almost reached the conclusion that this expansion project has been poorly implemented from the very beginning. In the various general staffs, officers add that if the lands already acquired--at the expropriation price of 18,000 francs per hectare in recent cases--were to be returned to their former owners, this operation would prove to be financially disastrous to the taxpayer.

For all these reasons, in the absence of Charles Hernu--detained in Villeurbanne--at the meeting of high-level officials in the Hotel Matignon, the defense minister was asked to submit to the government a series of recommendations ranging from a "freezing" of the project pending a legal decision to compromise solutions allowing the army to retain use of a camp it deems absolutely necessary for the training of draftees.

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## FIREPOWER, MOBILITY OF GROUND FORCES WEAPONS REVIEWED

Paris DEFENSE NATIONALE in French Jun 81 pp 159-165

[Article by Gerard Vaillant: "Power and Mobility of Fire Delivered by Ground Forces Weapons"]

[Excerpts] The following two recent events afford us an excellent opportunity to examine the power and mobility of surface-to-surface fire delivered by ground forces weapons:

a. On 20 March 1981, at Camp Mailly, General Delaunay, the army chief of staff, officially issued the ATILA (Automated Artillery Fire Direction and Communications) system to the 1st RAMA (Marine Artillery Regiment), in the presence of General Lacaze, the armed forces chief of staff.

b. On 26 March 1981, at Camp Canjuers, Defense Minister Robert Galley attended an exhibition--static displays, operational demonstrations, and live firing--of the following weapons and equipment that are now being issued to our army or will be shortly:

1. FAMAS 5.56-mm assault rifle;
2. Milan and HOT [antitank] missiles, the latter mounted on an SA 342M helicopter or a VAB (Forward-Area Armored Vehicle);
3. The 53 T 1 antiaircraft turret with a 20-mm F2 gun, mounted on a VLRA (Light Reconnaissance and Support Vehicle);
4. ERC90 SAQAIE wheeled combat reconnaissance armored vehicle;
5. AMX 10 RC [wheeled combat reconnaissance armored vehicle] and AMX 30 [main battle tank];
6. Towed 155 mm F1 gun and self-propelled 155 mm AUF 1 gun;
7. AMX10V-RA (Artillery Observation Vehicle) and the ATILA system with its associated equipment: laser rangefinder, universal navigation unit, Sirocco meteorological station, MIRADOP doppler mini-radar, and the RATAC [Field Artillery Fire Control Radar].

Before briefly describing these major items of equipment and their capabilities, it is fitting first to reflect on their ultimate purpose. We consider it appropriate, therefore, to make a few general observations on the conventional firepower requirements of our ground forces in the light of our strategy.

With all due deference to certain lyrical advocates of the exclusive use of nuclear firepower, conventional firepower is far from being obsolete. At the present time, it even appears to be an indispensable complement of a nuclear power's freedom of military action. In the case of a country like ours, there is no credibility to the claim that we will retaliate immediately with nuclear weapons against any aggression, regardless of its scale. Unless the enemy has been the first one to launch nuclear strikes, the employment of nuclear weapons is a decision too fraught with serious consequences to be made without having first exhausted all other ways and means of countering the aggression. This means that we military personnel will have to fight with whatever weapons we have in an effort to contain the enemy and thus give the government time to decide about employing tactical nuclear weapons at first--as a final warning--and then strategic nuclear weapons if necessary. Moreover, this battle to be fought against an enemy possessing numerical superiority in armor, mechanized units and artillery pieces, must not lead to the dispersion of our forces but rather to the enemy being compelled to concentrate its forces and call upon additional reinforcements, thereby presenting profitable targets for at first our conventional firepower, and afterwards our nuclear firepower.

The firepower of our units, enhanced by their mobility and relative protection, poses for the enemy the problem of nuclear escalation with all of its implied catastrophic prospects, a consideration which is a prime element of deterrence.

The high command is currently devoting its whole attention to the delivery of fire, its efficacy, and its cost-effectiveness, with the determination to make the best possible use of those types of ammunition that are limited in number and expensive.

Upon order of the army chief of staff, the February issue of TERRE-INFORMATION was devoted to the delivery of fire. In that issue's editorial, General Delaunay wrote that he gave "absolute priority to such activity in instruction and training programs. The delivery of fire is, in fact, the decisive factor in combat." He concluded his remarks with the following instructions: "Inculcate a new dynamism in your units. The delivery of fire...is our *raison d'être*.... Everyone should become impassioned with firing, especially the officers and NCO's who will imbue those around them with this great enthusiasm."

Camp Canjuers is in a way the "temple" of this passion for firing. Its firing ranges are host each year to all Milan and HOT missile launch crews, tank gunners and crews, and artillery regiments conducting service practice. This camp has modern equipment and facilities designed for full-scale unit combat firing practice under the most realistic field conditions: moving (or fleeting) targets, disappearing collapsible targets, small-arms firing course with pop-up targets, range for artillery forward observers, etc. A new tank gunnery range and course--called *Rhapsodie*--was opened at Camp Mailly this year.

At the same time, there is increasingly widespread use of gunnery training simulators in service schools and units. These devices include: the DX 150 simulator for AMX 30 tank gunners; laser rangefinders for section firing at the ABC [Armored Corps and Cavalry] School in Saumur, or for 105-mm gun and 20-mm gun target practice against ground or air targets at the 35th RI [Infantry Regiment]; the DX 143 simulator for the training of Milan missile crews; the DX147 for HOT missiles launched from the Gazelle and other helicopters; firing simulators for 20-mm antiaircraft guns and Hawk and Roland surface-to-air missiles; simulators for training artillery forward observers; subcaliber equipment simulating firing conditions with standard field artillery ammunition; not to mention the subcaliber ammunition and equipment, plus modern targets, for small arms firing. Instruction and training conducted with these efficient facilities produces convincing results. For example, after 400 simulated firings, a HOT missile crewman will be authorized to fire two live missiles--worth 80,000 francs apiece--with a statistically-established 90 percent single-shot hit probability. The same is true for surface-to-air missiles, inasmuch as it has been determined that 130 of the 150 Roland missiles launched by simulator-trained draftees have hit their target.

We shall now very briefly describe these weapon systems, with emphasis placed on the new character of some of them and also on expected future developments.

#### Milan Missile System

Milan is an infantry light antitank missile. Its launch unit can be carried on a man's back or mounted on a vehicle. The system has been in service since 1974, with 70 authorized each infantry division, and 40 each armored division and army corps infantry regiment.

The missile has a range of from 25 to 2,000 meters. The Milan gunner no longer has to "steer" the missile as he formerly did with the Entac or SS-11 antitank missiles. This is now done by the Milan's guidance unit using data furnished by infrared signals transmitted by a tracer carried by the missile. The gunner's workload is reduced to holding his line of sight on the target.

The missile is capable of penetrating a medium tank with a probability of 70 percent and a heavy tank with a probability of 80 percent. During his visit to Camp Canjuers, Robert Galley said this penetration capability had to be improved because of the problem created by the current introduction of new types of complex armor plate.

#### HOT Missile System

HOT is a wire-guided missile using the infrared radiation from a tracer. It has a maximum range of 4,000 meters, a cruise speed of 240 meters per second, and weighs 32 kilograms. It can penetrate any currently known armor.

It can be mounted on an SA342M Gazelle helicopter or on a VAB.

a. Mounted on a Gazelle Helicopter

The Gazelle has a two-man crew: the pilot and the gunner. It carries four ramp-mounted missiles. Using terrain defilades, the helicopter remains beyond the range of enemy antiaircraft weapons and disengages after launching its missiles.

The combat helicopter regiment includes two light helicopter flights (escadrilles), two tactical transport flights, and three armed helicopter flights equipped with HOT missiles. Each armed helicopter flight has 10 aircraft.

A total of 10 such armed helicopter flights are to be formed. The sixth is currently receiving its equipment.

b. Mounted on a VAB

A VAB carries 12 HOT missiles, four of them on launch ramps. Its reloading unit enables this system to fire two rounds per minute.

The VAB-HOT weapon system is still in the prototype stage. It is planned to deploy the system in each armored division antitank company and in the antitank company of the armored regiments of two infantry divisions, for a total of 12 VAB-HOT systems per division.

Engineering tests of the system were begun in 1980. Delivery to units is scheduled for the period 1983-1986.

ERC 90 SAGAIE

The SAGAIE is a light 8-ton wheeled armored vehicle designed for reconnaissance and combat missions in both a conventional and nuclear combat environment. It is armed with a new model 90-mm gun equipped with a laser rangefinder and an electronic fire control system. It is highly mobile--road speed: 110 kmph, in water: 9 kmph--and air transportable by C 160 Transall a distance of 3,700 kilometers. The vehicle demonstrated its ability to cover long distances over trails and unimproved roads by its performance in the Abidjan-Ouagadougou endurance run.

Orders for 51 ERC 90's have been received to date. These vehicles will be delivered first to the 9th DIMA's (Marine Infantry Division) RICM (Marine Infantry Tank Regiment) and then to the 11th Airborne (Paratroop) Division's armored regiment. It should be noted that the third major unit with an external rapid deployment mission, the 31st Demi-brigade with headquarters in Ashagne, will have its 21st RIMA (Marine Infantry Regiment) equipped not with ERC 90's but with AMX 10 RC's.

AMX 10 RC

This wheeled 6 x 6 armored vehicle weighs 15.6 tons. It replaces the EBR [wheeled armored reconnaissance vehicle], and in this capacity it will be



assigned to reconnaissance regiments destined to conduct combat operations after a long tactical movement, possibly in a contaminated environment. It has good mobility on land--60 kmph--and in water--7.2 kmph--as well as great cruising range (700 kilometers).

Its main armament is a 105-mm gun firing a projectile with a high muzzle velocity of 1,000 meters per second, and equipped with an automatic fire control system enabling it to fire out to a range of 2,000 meters by day and 1,000 meters by night. The AMX 10 RC carries 30 105-mm rounds and 4,000 7.62-mm rounds.

It is air transportable by C160 Transall (1,500 kilometers).

#### AMX 30

The AMX 30 is the main combat vehicle of the armored division's tank regiments. It is also scheduled to replace the AMX 13 [light tank] in the mechanized regiment's squadrons. The tank's power--19 horsepower per ton--gives it a good road speed of 45 kmph and a satisfactory range of 400-500 kilometers. It has a shallow fording capability of 2 meters and, with snorkel, a deep wading capability of 4 meters. Its 105-mm gun fires a shaped-charge round at a velocity of 1,000 meters per second. The tank also had one 20-mm gun and one 7.62-mm machine gun.

The B2 version of the AMX 30 is still in the prototype stage and undergoing tests. Improvements incorporated in the AMX 30B2 involve especially the turret which is enhanced by an integrated automatic fire control system based on a laser rangefinder, and a low light level television camera coupled to the fire control system.

We cannot conclude this review of our armored vehicles without mentioning the clarification made at Camp Canjuers by Robert Galley relative to the rumors being circulated about difficulties having arisen between France and the FRG over continuation of the Franco-German tank project. The defense minister asserted there was no major problem, that studies were continuing in both countries, and that the decision to implement the project was confirmed at the 1 March meeting in Strasbourg between Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and Helmut Schmidt.

#### New Artillery Equipment and Capabilities

The major beneficiary of the technological advances made in guns and in the application of electronics and computerized data processing to the automation of fire control, is the artillery. And to such a point that after the somber postwar period--somber because the importance of conventional firepower was forgotten and because on graduating from military academies, junior officers looked with disfavor upon the artillery when choosing their branch of service--artillery is today enjoying a revival and being revolutionized. All of the items of equipment we are now going to describe and which contribute to this renaissance of the artillery, form a veritable weapon system whose effectiveness is dependent upon the existence and reliability of its components.

## The 155-mm AUF 1 and 155-mm TR F 1 Guns

The 155-mm AUF 1 is a self-propelled gun mounted on an AMX 30 tank chassis. Adopted in July 1972, its production had been delayed by the development of a combustible shell casing, a technique that we alone have mastered. Beginning in 1982, this gun will be issued to corps artillery regiments and armored division artillery regiments. The planned production of 372 pieces at a rate of some 50 per year will take until 1988.

The 155-mm TR F 1 gun is still in the prototype stage and undergoing tests. It is to be issued to the artillery regiments of infantry divisions.\* It is towed by a 6 x 6 TRM 1000 truck, but also has its own engine which allows it to move short distances over all types of terrain at a speed of 4 kmph.

The table at the end of this article brings out the enhanced performance of these two guns. These improvements are in three areas: range, rate of fire, and times to emplace (place gun in firing position and ready to fire) and displace (move gun out of firing position).

a. Range is increased from 18-20 kilometers to 24 kilometers and even to 30 kilometers with use of an additional propelling charge. This greater range enhances deep supporting fire and extends the span of the sector of fire into the fringe area of units closely engaged with the enemy.

b. The new guns have twice the rate of fire of their predecessors. This is especially true of the 155-mm AUF 1 and in the first seconds of firing which are the most important in achieving surprise.

c. Times to emplace and displace: the AUF 1 takes a few minutes less time than the AMF 3. What is most pronounced, however, is the TR F 1's superiority in this regard over the old BF 50. This time saved is especially helpful in avoiding enemy counterbattery fire.

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\* Each regiment has one artillery regiment of one or the other type with four batteries of six guns each. The army corps has two 155-mm artillery regiments similar to those in the armored divisions. Upon mobilization, each corps artillery (ACA) will be reinforced by one to three 155-mm regiments from the general reserve, and consisting of only three batteries equipped with older materiel. Division artillery's primary task is to provide direct support whereas corps artillery is designed mainly for action in depth and counterbattery fire but can also reinforce direct supporting fire.

## ATILA System

The improvements introduced by the ATILA (Automated Artillery Fire Direction Communications) system are veritably revolutionizing artillery employment and capabilities just as much as the advances mentioned above, and perhaps even more so.

Our colleague Emmanuel Gepeyre covered this subject in the "army" section of last month's issue. We shall review the main points of his article for those of our readers who might not have it at hand.

The ATILA system is designed to improve the accuracy of artillery fire, reduce the reaction times of fire units, and ensure secure transmission of information by automatic operation of radio links.

The system operates on the teleprocessing principle by means of a central computer unit located in the regimental command post. An alternate command post is kept on standby and records the same data as the primary command post. The computer processes all data on the target designated by the observation team which is equipped with such efficient advanced devices as a laser range-finder--that accurately furnishes coordinates, range, and elevation by simply aiming its scope at the target--and a message entry device enabling a forward observer to transmit a fire request. His message is transmitted automatically by radio in secure fashion. This target information plus ballistic data furnished by the MIRADOP doppler mini-radar, meteorological data from the Sirocco station, status of communications nets, weapons and ammunition status, etc. are analyzed and interpreted by the central computer which then offers the fire direction officer a choice of solutions: optimum fire units, type of fire, number of rounds, etc. After the fire direction officer has selected the best solution suggested by the computer, the latter transmits the firing data to the selected fire units where it is then immediately displayed at the guns.

The resulting definite advantages of ATILA are:

- a. A considerable saving in time required for data transmission and calculations, and consequently a more rapid firing sequence which takes no more than 1 to 2 minutes from the forward observer's initial fire request to the opening of fire.
- b. Absolutely secure communications and calculations.
- c. The capability of proceeding directly to fire for effect thereby avoiding any adjustment of fire which formerly caused the advantage of surprise to be lost. Another advantage is the rapid rate of fire--144 rounds per regiment in the first minute of fire--which gives the regiment formidable firepower.

In addition, ATILA furnishes division commanders and the corps artillery commander with constantly updated information on the friendly situation wherever observation teams are located. Furthermore, the corps commander is able to maneuver his corps artillery and shift its fire almost instantaneously as needed.

Artillery has thus regained its primary role which is to be prepared at all times to furnish immediately available fire capable of coping with unforeseen situations. Artillery is also an important factor in the commander's freedom of action.

We can find no better way of concluding this article than by quoting General Maire, a former inspector general of artillery who, just before leaving that position to assume command of the 3d Military Region, wrote: "Artillery is gradually freeing itself from the exacting constraints of elementary techniques, now being taken over by machines, and devoting itself more and more to its tactical role."

Table on page 164

Comparison of Principal Field Artillery Guns

Mobility	<u>155 AFM 3</u>	<u>155 BF 50</u>	<u>155 AUF 1</u>	<u>155 Tr F1</u>
Type of movement	Self-propelled and accompanying truck	Towed	Self-propelled	Towed, but with APU <sup>2</sup>
Average road speed	30-40 kmph	30-40 kmph	40 kmph	60 kmph
Average cross-country speed	10-20 kmph	5 kmph	10-20 kmph	5 kmph
Cruising range	300 km or 9 hrs	600 km	400 km or 16 hrs	600 km
Operation				
Range	20 km	18 km	24-30 km <sup>1</sup>	24-30 km <sup>1</sup>
Traversing range	890 mils	1,400 mils	6,400 mils	1,100 mils
Time to emplace	5-10 min	Dependent upon terrain	2-3 min	2-4 min
Time to displace	5-15 min	15 min-1 hr	2-5 min	5-10 min
Rate of fire in 2 minutes	6 rounds	6 rounds	12 (incl. 6 rds in 4-5 sec)	12 (incl. 3 rds in 15 sec)
Gun crew	1 NCO, 9 enlisted men	1 NCO, 11 enlisted men	1 NCO, 3 enlisted men	1 NCO, 7 enlisted men

1. With additional propelling charge.

2. APU: auxiliary power unit mounted on gun carriage and enabling gun to travel a few hundred meters when being moved in or out of firing position.

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